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Abstract
This Article is structured as follows: first, it summarizes the European approach to develop-
ing integrated and well-functioning electricity and gas markets, giving an overview of the opening
of energy markets through Community legislation and the development of the current unbundling
regime. It puts the European approach in perspective, outlining experiences with unbundling in the
United States. Secondly, the malfunctioning of European energy markets is analyzed, presenting
the findings of the Sector Inquiry. It then explains how the problems identified can be addressed
using instruments at the Commission’s disposal, namely competition law enforcement and legis-
lation. In this context, the main elements of a new package of legislative proposals, which was
put forward by the Commission on September 19, 2007, are discussed. The particular focus of
this Article is on effective unbundling, where the advantages and (alleged) drawbacks of owner-
ship unbundling are presented as well as a model of an Independent System Operator (‘ISO‘). It
should be noted that this Article focuses on effective unbundling of Transmission System Opera-
tors (“TSOs”). Even though problems caused by insufficient unbundling have been found to exist
in other segments, such as distribution networks or gas storage markets, they are not discussed
in this Article. The Article concludes that ownership unbundling of transmission networks is the
simplest, most effective and most stable solution to improve competition in European energy mar-
kets and that in order to be equally effective an ISO must be “deep” in the sense that the system
operator must be in full control not only of network operations but also of investments, and must
be accompanied by detailed regulation and close regulatory oversight. A “shallow” ISO, which
only has the power to operate the network, is not effective given the substantial grid investments
needed to establish a true internal energy market in the EU. This conclusion is in line with the
legislative proposals of the Commission, which aim to create integrated and competitive energy
markets in the EU.
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INTRODUCTION
Energy policy is one of the European Union's ("EU") main
priorities for the coming years.' The creation of a well-function-
ing competitive internal energy market is essential to complete
an important part of the EU single market. The importance
given to energy issues in the EU is demonstrated by various ac-
tions which have been taken at the European level: the Euro-
pean Commission's recent Final Report on the Energy Sector
Inquiry ("Sector Inquiry" or "Final Report") under competition
law into these sectors, 2 numerous enforcement actions under
the Community competition rules,3 and last but not least new
legislative initiatives to address malfunctioning of energy mar-
kets.
The EU has already undergone important changes in the
energy sector in the last decade. However, much remains to be
done. Despite considerable progress in liberalization of the en-
ergy market in recent years, the goal of an integrated and com-
petitive single European market for electricity and gas has not
yet been achieved.
This Article is structured as follows: first, it summarizes the
European approach to developing integrated and well-function-
ing electricity and gas markets, giving an overview of the open-
ing of energy markets through Community legislation and the
development of the current unbundling regime4 . It puts the Eu-
ropean approach in perspective, outlining experiences with un-
* Commissioner for Competition, European Commission, Brussels.
1. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 121 (2007).
2. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission, Inquiry Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the Euro-
pean gas and electricity sectors (Final Report), COM (2006) 851 Final (Jan. 2007)
[hereinafter Final Report].
3. See, e.g., Commission Press Release, IP/03/547 (Apr. 16, 2003); see also Commis-
sion Press Release, IP/04/573 (Apr. 30, 2004).
4. Unbundling refers to the effective separation between the operation of electric-
ity and gas networks from supply and generation activities. See Europa Glossary, Un-
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bundling in the United States. Secondly, the malfunctioning of
European energy markets is analyzed, presenting the findings of
the Sector Inquiry. It then explains how the problems identified
can be addressed using instruments at the Commission's dispo-
sal, namely competition law enforcement and legislation. In this
context, the main elements of a new package of legislative pro-
posals, which was put forward by the Commission on September
19, 2007,1 are discussed. The particular focus of this Article is on
effective unbundling, where the advantages and (alleged) draw-
backs of ownership unbundling are presented as well as a model
of an Independent System Operator ("ISO").
It should be noted that this Article focuses on effective un-
bundling of Transmission System Operators ("TSOs"). Even
though problems caused by insufficient unbundling have been
found to exist in other segments, such as distribution networks
or gas storage markets, they are not discussed in this Article.6
The Article concludes that ownership unbundling of trans-
mission networks is the simplest, most effective and most stable
solution to improve competition in European energy markets
and that in order to be equally effective an ISO must be "deep"
in the sense that the system operator must be in full control not
only of network operations but also of investments, and must be
accompanied by detailed regulation and close regulatory over-
sight. A "shallow" ISO, which only has the power to operate the
network, is not effective given the substantial grid investments
needed to establish a true internal energy market in the EU.
This conclusion is in line with the legislative proposals of the
Commission, which aim to create integrated and competitive en-
ergy markets in the EU.
bundling, http://ec.europa.eu/comm./competition/generalinfo/u_en.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2008).
5. See generally Commission Press Release, IP/98/1060 (Dec. 19, 2007) (discussing
the Commission's package of proposed regulations and directives to further liberalize
the EU's energy markets).
6. The legislative proposal is "aimed at transmission networks, which are the high
voltage or high pressure main lines connected to other Member States. By contrast,
distribution networks consist of local grids which operate at lower voltages and pressures,
which typically do not have cross border connections." Delegation of the European
Commission to Japan, Energising Europe: A Real Market With Secure Supply, MEMO/
07/361 (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news en newsobj24
85.php (emphasis added).
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I. LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKETS
The EU embarked upon a course of energy market liberali-
zation ten years ago.7 The aim was, and still is, to spur competi-
tion, increase efficiency and bring Europe's energy prices to
competitive levels. Liberalization of the EU electricity and gas
sectors has focused on key issues such as the separation of opera-
tors of networks and other essential infrastructure from energy
producers and suppliers, non-discriminatory access for third par-
ties to networks and other infrastructure, gradual removal of ex-
clusive supply rights, and the establishment of independent reg-
ulators with effective powers.'
Initially, industrial energy consumers, which were the first
to become free to switch suppliers, benefited from significant
price decreases. However, more recently, Europe has seen
prices rise across the board. At the same time, the Commission
has become increasingly concerned about the way many Mem-
ber States have gone about introducing competition under the
existing legislation. This was often done in a minimalist man-
ner, which meant that the position of incumbent companies
could not be realistically challenged. Since then, the evidence
that there is a need for fundamental structural change in the
electricity and gas industry in the form of effective unbundling
has been building up.
A. Development of Legislative Framework in the EU
In the pre-liberalization phase (1990-1996), a directive in-
troducing a Community procedure to improve the transparency
of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial end-users was
adopted to help determine the price differences between Mem-
ber States and hence the level of market integration in the gas
and electricity sectors.9 In 1990 and 1991 directives on electric-
ity and gas transit were adopted to provide a framework for the
exchange of electricity and gas between incumbent operators to
strengthen security of supply and reduce costs."° These direc-
7. See Council Directive No. 98/30, O.J. L 204/1, at 1-3 (1997).
8. See generally CHRISTOPHER W. JONES & WILLIAM WEBSTER, EU ENERGY LAW, VOL.
UME 1: THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET 4-11 (2d ed. 2006).
9. See Council Directive No. 90/377, O.J. L 185/16, at 16-17 (1990) (concerning a
Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices
charged to industrial end-users).
10. Council Directive No. 90/547, O.J. L 313/30, at 30 (1990) (on the transit of
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tives obliged Member States to facilitate transit of electricity and
gas, but statutory monopolies on the supply of electricity and gas
to end-consumers were unaffected."1
Within the first liberalization package, the so called first
Electricity Directive was adopted in December 1996 and had to
be transposed by February 1999.12 The first Gas Directive was
adopted in June 1998 and had to be transposed by August
2000.13 The aim of the first liberalization Directives was to move
from a system of vertically integrated (or vertically demarcated)
companies, often with legal supply monopolies, to a system that
distinguished between areas where competition was possible and
areas of natural monopoly to which other undertakings would
have access at a reasonable cost.1 4 Already at that early stage, the
Community legislator identified the risk that vertically integrated
incumbents could use their monopolies over the transmission
networks to stifle the emergence of competition in the supply
business.15 Rules were established to mitigate that risk, includ-
ing the introduction of a Third Party Access ("TPA") regime and
unbundling provisions to ensure that vertically integrated opera-
tors would not discriminate against new entrants or create other
entry barriers. 6
It is to be noted that in the first Electricity and Gas Direc-
tives the requirements for unbundling were limited to account-
ing and management unbundling for electricity and only ac-
counting unbundling for gas.1 7 With respect to gas, there was no
obligation to nominate an identifiable transmission system oper-
electricity through transmission grids); Council Directive No. 91/296, O.J. L 147/37, at
37-38 (1991) (on the transit of natural gas through grids).
11. See JONES & WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 57 ("The Directives provided neither for
unbundling nor for any effective regulation and had little real effect.").
12. Council Directive No. 96/92, art. 27, OJ. L 27/20, at 29 (1997) (concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity) [hereinafter First Electricity Direc-
tive].
13. Council Directive No. 98/30, art. 30, O.J. L 204/1, at 12 (1998) (concerning
common rules for the internal market in natural gas) [hereinafter First Gas Directive].
14. See First Electricity Directive, O.J. L 27/20 (1997); First Gas Directive, O.J. L
204/1 (1998); see also JONEs & WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 13-14, 22.
15. See First Electricity Directive, 1 37, O.J. L 27/20 (1997); First Gas Directive,
28, O.J. L 204/1, at 3 (1998).
16. See First Electricity Directive, arts. 16-22, O.J. L 27/20 (1997); First Gas Direc-
tive, arts. 14-23, OJ. L 204/1, at 7-10 (1998).
17. See First Electricity Directive, arts. 13-15, O.J. L 27/20 (1997); First Gas Direc-
tive, arts. 12-13, O.J. L 204/1, at 6-7 (1998); see a/soJONES & WEBSTER, supra note 8, at
10.
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ator.' 8 In the years immediately following the implementation
of these Directives, it became clear that the requirements were
inadequate. The Commission carried out a number of
benchmarking exercises, which demonstrated clearly that in
Member States where limited unbundling took place, competi-
tion was severely restricted and discrimination was common.1 9
Given the substantial problems with competition in the elec-
tricity and gas sectors in spite of the transposition of the first
liberalization package, and at the request of the European Coun-
cil of March 2000 "to speed up liberalisation" in these sectors
with the aim of achieving "a fully functional operational internal
market" in these areas, the Commission proposed a second liber-
alization package covering both the electricity and gas sectors.20
The main aims were to strengthen the unbundling requirements
on network operators, to strengthen the rights of access to the
networks, to remove the remaining exclusive supply rights and
to establish independent sectoral regulators. 2 ' With this new
legislation Member States agreed on a timetable to open elec-
tricity and gas markets fully to competition.2 In addition to the
second Electricity and Gas Directives 23 and the Regulations on
cross-border exchanges in electricity and access to gas transmis-
sion networks,24 the EU also adopted other legislation that has
an important impact on the development of well-functioning
competitive markets in these sectors.25
18. See JONES & WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 71.
19. See id.
20. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 96/92 and 98/30 con-
cerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and natural gas, OJ. C
240E/60 (2001) [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
21. Id. 5, OJ. C 240E/60, at 60 (2001).
22. Id. 3, OJ. C 240E/60, at 60 (2001).
23. Council Directive No. 2003/54, O.J. L 176/37 (2003) [hereinafter Second
Electricity Directive); Council Directive No. 2003/55, OJ. L 176/57 (2003) [hereinafter
Second Gas Directive].
24. Commission Regulation No. 1228/2003, O.J. L 176/1 (2003) (on conditions
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity); Commission Regu-
lation 1775/2005, O.J. L 289/1 (2005) (on conditions for access to natural gas transmis-
sion networks).
25. These include: (i) the public procurement directives, Council Directive No.
2004/17, O.J. L 134/1 (2004); (ii) two directives to ensure minimum standards for
security of supply, Council Directive No. 2004/67, OJ. L 127/92 (2004) and Council
Directive No. 2005/89, O.J. L 33/32 (2006); (iii) trans-European energy networks,
Council Decision No. 1229/2003/EC, O.J. L 176/11 (2003); and (iv) environmental
1392 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:1387
The creation of a regulatory framework to improve the
functioning of the internal market for electricity and gas is ongo-
ing. On January 10, 2007, the Commission published a compre-
hensive Energy Package comprising inter alia the Final Report
on the Energy Sector Inquiry2 6 and a Communication on pros-
pects for the Internal Market.2 7 The Package included concrete
suggestions to improve inter alia the structural and regulatory
framework for energy liberalization, including options for
achieving effective network unbundling.2" The European Coun-
cil of March 8-9, 2007 and the European Parliament report on
the Energy Package in July 2007 broadly supported the need for
effective unbundling.29 On September 19, 2007, the Commis-
provisions including legislation on energy efficiency, Council Directive No. 2006/32,
O.J. L 114/64 (2006), promotion of electricity generation from renewable energy
sources, Council Directive No. 2001/77, OJ. L 283/33 (2001), and an emissions trad-
ing scheme, Council Directive No. 2003/87, O.J. L 275/32 (2003).
26. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council and the European Parliament, An Energy Policy for Europe,
COM (2007) 1 Final (Jan. 2007) [hereinafter Energy Policy].
27. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council and the European Parliament, Prospects for the Internal Gas
and Electricity Market, COM (2006) 841 Final (Jan. 2007) [hereinafter Prospects for the
Internal Gas and Electricity Market].
28. See Energy Policy, supra note 26, COM (2007) 1 Final, at 3.1.1. The other
proposals focused on: harmonization of the powers and independence of the regula-
tors; the promotion of the European market by establishing a new single body at EU
level or through a network of European regulators; harmonization of the technical
standards necessary to enable cross-border trade; the establishment of a Community
mechanism and structure for Transmission System Operators ("TSOs"); tabling in 2007
of minimal standards on transparency; a Customers' Energy Charter; and further pro-
gress on new interconnectors, including the appointment of European coordinators to
take forward priority projects and the fixing of a five year maximum duration within
which the planning and approval procedures of projects of European interest should
be completed. Id. at 3.1.1-3.1.7. Due to the different focus of this Article, these aspects
are not elaborated in detail in this Article.
29. See E.U. BuuL., no. 3, at 1 (2007) ("Taking note of the Commission's internal
market report and the final report following the sector inquiry on the gas and electric-
ity markets, with the aim of increasing competition, ensuring effective regulation and
encouraging investment to benefit consumers, the European Council ... taking ac-
count of the characteristics of the gas and electricity sectors and of national and re-
gional markets, agrees on the need for[ ] effective separation of supply and production
activities from network operations (unbundling), based on independently run and ade-
quately regulated network operation systems which guarantee equal and open access to
transport infrastructures and independence of decisions on investment in infrastruc-
ture."). In its Resolution on prospects for the internal gas and electricity market
adopted on July 10, 2007, the European Parliament considered "transmission owner-
ship unbundling to be the most effective tool to promote investments in infrastructures
in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the grid for new entrants and transparency in
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sion put forward legislative proposals to implement these agreed
aims.30
B. Unbundling Regime in the EU
The EU has decided that effective unbundling is essential
for the development of well-functioning, liberalized energy mar-
kets, which is one of its key goals.
Since the beginning of the liberalization process there were
indications that a significant degree of unbundling is needed in
order to ensure non-discriminatory access to the networks and to
avoid conflicts of interest within vertically integrated energy
companies. So far the EU has concentrated on management
and accounting unbundling,"' and subsequently legal un-
bundling. Ownership has been left untouched and therefore
most transmission networks are still owned by the vertically inte-
grated utilities.
The current Electricity and Gas Directives impose minimum
obligations on energy network operators with regard to legal and
functional unbundling between transmission/distribution net-
works on the one hand and upstream (generation or production
and downstream supply) functions on the other." In particular,
the Electricity and Gas Directives required Member States to en-
sure that TSOs from July 1, 2004 and Distribution System Opera-
tors ("DSOs") from July 1, 2007, are independent at least in
terms of their legal form, organization and decision making (in
addition to accounting unbundling-and management un-
the market." European Parliament Resolution on Prospects for the Internal Gas and
Electricity Market, Eur. Parl. Doc. (A6-0249/2007), 2 (2007) (Provisional Edition)
[hereinafter European Parliament Resolution].
30. See Commission of the European Community, Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/54/EC concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM (2007) 528 Final (Sept. 2007)
[hereinafter Third Electricity Directive]; Commission of the European Community,
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Di-
rective 2003/55/EC concerning common rules for internal market in natural gas, COM
(2007) 529 Final (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter Third Gas Directive].
31. For more details, see generally DIRECTORATE-GENERAL ENERGY & TRANSPORT,
NOTE OF DC ENERGY & TRANSPORT ON DiRcrvEs 2003/54/EC AND 2003/55/EC ON
THE INTERNAL MARKET IN ELECrRICITY AND NATURAL GAs: THE UNBUNDLING REGIME
(Jan. 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/legislation/doc/
notes_for_implementation_2004/unbundling-en.pdf.
32. See Second Electricity Directive, arts. 10, 15, O.J. L 176/37, at 45-46 (2003);
Second Gas Directive, arts. 9, 13, O.J. L 176/57, at 64-65 (2003).
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bundling for TSOs-as already required), without creating an
obligation to separate the ownership of assets of the transmission
system from the vertically integrated undertaking. 33 These Di-
rectives set out detailed rules on management unbundling, in-
cluding the establishment of a compliance program to avoid dis-
crimination.34 However, it indicates that this "should not pre-
vent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to
ensure that the economic and management supervisions rights
of the parent company in respect of return on assets . . . in a
subsidiary are protected. 35 In order to ensure that the un-
bundling obligations are respected, the Directives require "infor-
mation unbundling" through the creation of information barri-
ers between supply and network activities. 3 16 In practice, signifi-
cant differences persist as regards the level of the
implementation of the unbundling provisions. In a number of
Member States, the unbundling provisions are still missing due
to the lack of timely, complete or correct transposition of the
Directives into national law. 7 In some instances the process of
unbundling has not yet been finalized by network operators,
partly as a result of the late implementation of the Directives by
Member States. 38 This applies, in particular, to gas transmission
but also to DSOs.39 It could be argued that different degrees of
33. Member States are authorized to exempt integrated gas and electricity distribu-
tors supplying less than 100,000 customers, or small isolated networks, from the legal
unbundling requirements. See GOMEZ-ACEBO & POMBO ABOGADOS, S.L. & CHARLES RuS-
SELL LLP, UNBUNDLING OF ELECTRICIY" AND GAS TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
OPERATORS: FINAL REPORT 3 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electric-
ity/publications/doc/2006 03 08 finalcommonreport.pdf.
34. See Second Electricity Directive, art. 10, O.J. L 176/37, at 45 (2003); Second
Gas Directive, art. 9, O.J. L 176/57, at 64 (2003).
35. See Second Electricity Directive, art. 10(c), O.J. L 176/37, at 45 (2003); Second
Gas Directive, art. 9(c), O.J. L 176/57, at 64 (2003).
36. See Second Electricity Directive, arts. 12, 16, O.J. L 176/37, at 4647 (2003);
Second Gas Directive, arts. 10, 14, O.J. L 176/57, at 64-66 (2003).
37. As a consequence, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings in
April 2006 by sending letters of formal notice to Austria, Czech Republic, France, Ire-
land, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Spain. In these Member States, legal and/or func-
tional unbundling is not yet complete. In addition, five Member States benefit from
derogations under the provisions of the Second Gas Directive or do not have a func-
tioning gas market. Reasoned opinions, the second step in the infringement proce-
dure, were sent in December 2006. See Commission Press Release, IP/06/1768 (Dec.
12, 2006).
38. See GOMEZ-ACEBO & POMBO ABOGADOS, S.L. & CHARLES RUSSELL LLP, supra
note 33, at 15, 19-20.
39. Regarding distribution, when implementing the unbundling provisions of the
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unbundling exist between Member States, undermining the cre-
ation of a level playing field in energy markets.
On the other hand, there are a significant number of com-
panies in the EU that have gone further than the minimum re-
quirements of the Directives and have already successfully un-
dergone the ownership unbundling process:
In the electricity sector, 13 Member States have gone beyond
the requirements of legal and functional unbundling of the
present Directive by implementing full ownership un-
bundling of the transmission networks. In the gas sector, 6
out of the relevant 21 Member States have opted for owner-
ship unbundling of the TSOs. While ownership unbundling
of TSOs has often taken place as part of the privatisation pro-
cess of state owned monopoly companies, some countries
such as the Netherlands, Italy and Spain have, in recent years,
carried out full ownership unbundling of largely privately
owned energy companies. In Spain and Italy, ownership un-
bundling was achieved by gradually restricting the sharehold-
ing of the integrated companies in the network operators. In
the Netherlands, a law passed in the year 2000 required state
ownership of all essential grids which resulted in the full sepa-
ration of the electricity and gas networks.4"
The choice of these Member States to adopt ownership un-
bundling was triggered by various considerations, mainly stem-
ming from the expected strategic benefits. In some cases separa-
tion has been the result of national legislation. In other cases,
the undertakings were heavily influenced by the regulatory envi-
ronment and the fact that a bundled organization structure was
failing to meet the expectations of customers or shareholders,
and so opted for a voluntary ownership separation (e.g. British
directives most Member States made full use of all the possible derogations by exempt-
ing smaller distributors from both legal and functional unbundling and postponing
legal unbundling for larger distributors until July 2007. Id. at 20.
40. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Docu-
ment Accompanying the Legislative Package on the Internal Market for Electricity and
Gas-Impact Assessment, SEC (2007) Final 1179, at 22-23, 4.1.1.1 (Sept. 2007) [here-
inafter Impact Assessment]. EU member states with full ownership unbundling for
their electricity TSOs are: Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. In the
gas sector, the TSOs of Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Hungary
and the U.K. are ownership unbundled. It should be noted that six Member States
have a derogation from the unbundling requirements, i.e. Cyprus, Finland, Greece (un-
til end 2006), Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. Id. at 22 n.6.
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Gas).41
C. Experience With Unbundling in the United States
The EU is not the only part of the world to introduce com-
petition in gas and electricity markets. Similar efforts have been
undertaken in other regions including the United States. The
fact that independent operation of the transmission system is
crucial for the creation of efficient energy markets is fully recog-
nized on both sides of the Atlantic.
Although any comparisons between the European Union
and the United States must be drawn with great care, given the
regulatory and structural differences, U.S. experiences in the gas
and electricity sectors are interesting as regards unbundling
measures.
In the United States the transmission system has been regu-
lated at the federal level by the Federal Energy Regulatory Coun-
cil ("FERC") for both gas and electricity.42 Over the past fifteen
to twenty years, FERC has sought to open transmission networks
to third party access and to encourage competition at the whole-
sale level.4" It has taken a slightly different approach for electric-
ity than for gas at the transmission level.44 However, the ulti-
mate objective of a non-discriminatory and open regime for ac-
cess to the network is common to both sectors.
The electricity sector in the United States was historically
organized on the basis of local vertically integrated companies
serving rather small areas, each with their own transmission net-
work.45 These local monopolists might supply customers di-
rectly, or alternatively would supply a local municipality which
41. See id. at 35-36.
42. See Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-7172 (2006)
(establishing and defining function of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC")).
43. See Paul Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States 17-18 (Cambridge-MIT
Inst., Working Paper No. 54, 2004).
44. As regards distribution networks, they are regulated purely at state level and
there is no obligation on state authorities either to open the retail market to competi-
tion or to introduce any unbundling requirements for the distribution network. Many
states (about twenty of the fifty) have, however, opened the retail market to competi-
tion and introduced requirements at state level regarding unbundling of distribution
networks. See JONEs & WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 378.
45. SeeJoskow, supra note 43, at 3.
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would deal with customers.46 The main piece of regulatory ac-
tion to separate transmission networks in the electricity sector
was the so-called FERC Order 2000, which was adopted by FERC
in the year 2000.17 The 2000 Order required transmission com-
panies to make submissions to the FERC concerning how they
intended to ensure regional transmission operation.48 TSOs
were also required to make a submission to FERC if they did not
intend to join one of the proposed Regional Transmission Oper-
ators ("RTOs"), and to justify the reasons why.4" The incentive
given to vertically integrated companies to join RTOs was the
prospect that FERC would be more likely to lift direct price con-
trols over the wholesale electricity market where they could
demonstrate functioning competition.5" This, in turn, would be
more likely when the relevant market was a large integrated re-
gion. Accordingly, a number of RTOs have now been set up.51
The FERC Order 2000 left a large degree of flexibility as to
what was meant by a regional transmission operator. It left it up
to the participants to decide whether the RTO would comprise
both the owner and operator of the system (the so-called
"Transco" model) or whether the ISO model would apply
whereby a single ISO would co-ordinate the operation of several
grids still owned by vertically integrated companies.52 However,
the Order did specify that the operator should be independent
46. See generally id. In this respect, there are several parallels with the pre-liberaliza-
tion position in many EU Member States. Most, however, nationalized and merged
their energy companies at some stage and so, with the notable exception of Germany,
prior to liberalization most EU energy companies were largely national. Id. at 6.
47. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2007).
48. See id. § 35.34(c).
49. See id. § 35.34(g); see alsoJoskow, supra note 43, at 28.
50. See JONES & WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 380.
51. In the United States, seven Independent Systems Operators ("ISOs")/Regional
Transmission Operators ("RTOs") currently operate. The RTOs include: California
Independent System Operator (California ISO); ISO New England (ISO-NE, an RTO);
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator (Midwest ISO, an RTO); PJM In-
terconnection (PJM, an RTO); and Southwest Power Pool (SPP, an RTO). The ISOs
include: New York Independent System Operator (NYISO); and Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT, an ISO). See ISO/RTO Council, ISO RTO Operating Re-
gions, http://www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2604471/k.B14E/Map.htm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2008). California, New England, and the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Maryland (PJM) markets were the first three U.S. markets to undergo regulatory re-
structuring. See James B. Bushnell, Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, Vertical Arrange-
ments, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets 2
(Yale Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. ES-40, 2005).
52. SeeJoskow, supra note 43, at 30 n.26.
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in ownership terms from the market participants in the region
covered. Most of the regional transmission operators established
since the 2000 Order have the characteristics of an ISO. They
are largely of the "shallow" ISO type5" since they have limited
control over investments.
There appears to be a general acceptance that ISOs have
substantially improved the network access arrangements, al-
lowed for the integration of markets and enhanced the degree
of transparency available to market participants. However the
ISO model is not without its critics, particularly with regard to
the fact that, since ownership of the assets still remains with verti-
cally integrated companies, the incentives for investment are
often reduced. RTOs have been accused of having an "identity
crisis" since they do not have the incentives and motivation of a
pure transmission company, nor do they have the competence
and responsibility of a public transmission owner.5 4
The FERC itself has repeatedly emphasized the problem of
under-investment in transmission in the last twenty years.55 In
the 2004 Report on the State of the Markets it noted that "[a] t
53. For more details on "shallow" ISO model, see Section V of this paper.
54. See TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY STUDY GROUP, EFFEcTrIvE SOLUTIONS FOR
GETTING NEEDED TRANSMISSION BUILT AT REASONABLE COST 6 (2004), available at
http://www.tapsgroup.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfies/effectivesolutions.pdf.
The Transmission Access Policy Study Group ("TAPS"), an informal association of inde-
pendent producers, have argued that vertically integrated companies have failed to in-
vest in transmission assets either due to competition for investment funds within the
group with regulated returns seen as too low by the integrated board or due to avoid-
ance of investment to protect the market share of their generation. Id. at 6. It argued
that ownership of the transmission company should be widened so that all suppliers in
the area in question have a small percentage ownership of the grid company. This, it is
argued, changes the incentives and gives other companies a "seat at the table" as far as
decision making is concerned. Id. at 9-10. They point to the successful example in
Wisconsin where the four existing transmission companies ceded their asset to form the
"American Transmission Company" ("ATC"). They each received fifty percent of this
value back in shares in ATC and the rest in cash. The remaining part was then sold on
to other market participants and there are now twenty-eight shareholder members.
While this company owns the assets, the operation of the system is undertaken within
the wider Midwest Independent ISO. According to the TAPS report, the ATC company
has a very high credit rating (A- Standard and Poor) and has been able to increase
transmission investment from US$246 million planned to US$646 million actual during
2001-2004. Id. at 10-11. A similar exercise in Vermont, where each supplier owns a
proportion of the transmission company in relation to the load served, has also created
good results. Id. at 11. TAPS also points to an alternative structural arrangement where
two or more transmission owners agree to jointly operate and plan investments in their
networks. Id. at 12-13.
55. See FERC, 2004 STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, OFFICE OF MARKET OVERSIGHT
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the end of 2003, stand-alone transmission companies ... contin-
ued to pursue investment levels that far exceeded what they had
pursued when they were part of integrated utilities."5 6 However,
the FERC does not dispose of sufficient powers to impose such a
solution without such a decision being challenged in court and
held up for a long period of time." This is one reason why the
RTO Order was, in some ways, a rather soft law solution, which
left it open to some companies not to participate.
RTOs have also been accused of becoming self-perpetuating
bureaucracies, with built-in incentives to block eventual evolu-
tion of the energy industry structure towards independent trans-
mission companies. It should also be emphasized that RTOs are
voluntary agreements where new members may join and leave
their RTO, and which were developed because their member
companies are relatively small in their region and so have an
interest in participating in a joint market pool.5 8 In fact, the
U.S. RTOs were not created as a remedy to avoid market foreclo-
sure. Instead, they provided cost saving opportunities for net-
work operators that they were free to pursue, unhindered by the
supply interests of the companies to which they belong.59
As regards the gas sector, the more sparsely populated na-
ture of much of the United States, the restriction of gas use
largely to urban areas, and the fact that the industry has never
been under nationalized control, has resulted in a structure
where there is range of competing gas pipelines which link up
production and import centers and load areas. This has resulted
in a different regulatory framework for gas.
Gas transmission pipelines have been required to offer TPA
since FERC Order 636 in 1992.60 This has allowed for competi-
tion at the wholesale level and there is a high level of liquidity
AND INVESTIGATIONS 26-28 (2005), available at http://ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/
20050615093455-06-15-05-som2004.pdf [hereinafter STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT].
56. Id. at 28.
57. See, e.g., Md. People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (limiting
FERC's authority); see also Federal Power Act, 16 U.SCA. §791a (West 2007); Laura
Dietz & Theresa Lemming, Public Utilities, 64 AM. JUR. 2D Pub. Utils. § 229 (2007) (giv-
ing overview of FERC's authority).
58. There are approximately 490 owners of transmission assets in the United States
compared with some thirty-seven in the EU.
59. See Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integra-
tion, 28 ENERGY L.J. 147, 149-55 (2007).
60. See 18 C.F.R. § 284.7 (2007).
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with a range of regional hubs, whose prices are set with refer-
ence to the main "Henry Hub" in Louisiana.61 At retail level, the
decision to open markets, as for electricity, is left to individual
states. 62 Those states which have opened the retail market for
electricity have also done so for gas.
This has all been achieved within a framework of just legal
unbundling. However, an important difference from the Euro-
pean Union to date is that, following Order 636, all supply/
transmission contracts between producers and local distribu-
tors/suppliers, which used to comprise both the commodity and
point to point transmission to the "city gate," were required to
be renegotiated as transmission only contracts, with the primary
capacity holder being the local distributor/supplier and not the
producer.63 These local supply/distribution companies were
then also permitted to sell unused capacity in secondary mar-
kets. 64 Previously, any unused capacity would be returned to the
pipeline operator for re-sale. 6' These two changes resulted in a
large amount of transmission capacity being released to the mar-
ket and led to a large increase in capacity utilization.
This restructuring of contracts, which amounts to a cancel-
lation and restructuring of long term transmission contracts, was
made possible by ensuring instead that gas pipelines are able to
recover a rather high regulated return on these assets and all of
the costs associated with introducing TPA. New investment in
pipelines is now largely on a regulated basis and once projects
are approved by the FERC and completed, they are bought into
the tariff calculations. The fact that pipelines are no longer
blocked by old contracts (contractual congestion) and the rela-
tive ease in constructing new facilities means that transmission
companies have been prepared to delegate a large part of the
system operation to so-called "Hubs" on a voluntary basis.66
61. See Monika Ehrman, Competition Is a Sin: An Evaluation of the Formation and
Effects of a Natural Gas OPEC, 27 ENERGY L.J. 175, 195-96 (2006) (describing how price of
gas is set in the United States).
62. See JONEs & WEBsTER, supra note 8, at 378.
63. See 18 CFR § 284.7-.8 (2007).
64. See id.
65. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAs 1994: IssuEs AND TRENDS, 45, DOE/
EIA-0560(94) (1994), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural-gas/
analysis-publications/naturalgas_1994_issues-trends/pdf/056094.pdf.
66. See id. at 15. Hubs are not just financial market places; they also manage the
co-ordination of the nomination and dispatch of the pipelines in their vicinity. Id.
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The FERC report on the State of Markets in 2004 noted that
the gas industry was continuing to invest in infrastructure capac-
ity with overall spending of US$3.75 billion in 2003 and US$2.18
billion in 2004.67 Most of the investments were short distance
improvements. FERC noted that price differences between re-
gions were not high enough to justify many long distance invest-
ments. They are of the view that, "overall, gas infrastructure in-
vestment in North America has been an important market suc-
cess story for many years. "68
The extent to which the U.S. experiences are applicable to
the European Union is unclear.69 Certainly the contract struc-
ture in the EU is very different to that imposed by Order 636
since the main gas producers and importers currently also often
hold capacity rights and own the gas in the network up to the
"city gate," i.e. the distribution area. And it seems that the ex-
isting pipeline companies are not as ready to invest in increased
capacity since they will effectively be allowing competitors in to
compete against their own gas. 7° As regards electricity, regional
market governance, with the appropriate stakeholder involve-
ment, is being considered and a whole variety of economic issues
in applying RTO concepts could be of relevance.
("Hubs provide both physical and transactional services. Physical services include gas
wheeling, parking, transportation, storage, compression, and processing. Transactional
services being offered consist of title transfer, buyer-seller matching, balancing, and
electronic bulletin board ("EBB") information."). For example, the Nicor Hub has af-
filiates in gas trade and supply services in the Chicago area and provides a market for
transmission services on seven major interstate pipelines. It is effectively a Gas ISO.
The hub also manages under-utilized storage capacity on behalf of seven underground
storage facilities belonging to Nicor Gas (its supply affiliate) based on regulated tariffs.
Gas hubs in the United States therefore effectively amount to independent gas TSOs
that have been set up on a voluntary basis.
67. STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 55, at 139.
68. Id. at 145.
69. "[T]he U.S. is a country whose electricity sector is stuck somewhere between
the old regime of state regulated vertically integrated monopolies and a regime of liber-
alized wholesale and retail markets and supporting institutions and regulatory mecha-
nisms for supporting them efficiently." Joskow, supra note 43, at 52.
70. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY 2006, 15-16, DAF/COMP(2007)24/12 (2007), available
at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2007doc.nsf/7b20clf93939d029c125685d005300b1/
f9393b4e78cf7fd4c12573750058f3c9/$FILE/T03233959.PDF (noting the Italian Com-
petition Authority's case against ENI concerning the decision not to enlarge the Trans
Tunisian Pipeline Company ("TTPC") pipeline).
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II. MALFUNCTIONING OF EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKETS
In recent years the Commission has been faced with the fact
that despite liberalization of the EU energy markets, the markets
remained largely national and dominated by traditional suppli-
ers. As a result, the benefits of well-functioning, competitive and
integrated markets, including increased choice and lower prices
for consumers, have not been achieved in many places. The
Commission has become increasingly aware that the existing le-
gal rules and regulatory measures are not sufficient to bring de-
cisive change to gas and electricity markets.
A. Competition Sector Inquiry Findings
In 2005, the Commission launched the Sector Inquiry into
the European gas and electricity sectors, which was the largest
ever exercise in information gathering and analysis of the EU
energy markets. It aimed at identifying the obstacles that were
holding back effective competition. The evidence gathered
shows that the market structure remains largely non-competitive,
in spite of the repeated efforts in areas such as legal and func-
tional unbundling and access to networks. At the beginning of
2007, the Commission published the Final Report on the Sector
Inquiry,7 which highlighted a number of structural problems in
energy markets that remain from the pre-liberalization period.
The main findings of the inquiry indicate that European energy
markets are too highly concentrated and not liquid enough,
there is insufficient unbundling of network and supply activities,
and there is an absence of cross-border integration and cross-
border competition.
Firstly, as regards market concentration, the Sector Inquiry
shows that incumbents continue to have very high market shares
in their respective national markets. Gas and electricity markets
remain concentrated at the national level and this creates a se-
vere obstacle to develop competition. These markets in most of
the Member States are dominated by a single undertaking and
there is often inadequate import capacity for cross border com-
petition to act as a significant constraint. All this gives too much
71. See Final Report, supra note 2; Commission of the European Communities, DG
Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC (2006) 1724 (Jan. 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Technical Annex to Final Report]. The Final Report summarizes the results of the
inquiry, which are presented in more detail in the Technical Annex to the Final Report.
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leeway to incumbents to exercise market power, and so impose
high prices.72
Secondly, European energy markets are characterized by a
high degree of vertical integration, in other words, insufficient
unbundling of network and supply activities. The problem iden-
tified stems from the fact that the EU energy companies not only
control essential facilities, such as electricity transmission systems
and gas transport networks, but also enjoy significant market
power in the downstream energy markets. The centralized pro-
duction, transmission and distribution structures characterizing
the European electricity and gas system have led to extremely
high entry barriers for newcomers.
Similarly, vertical integration between upstream (e.g. elec-
tricity generation) and downstream (e.g. electricity supply)
mean that turnover on wholesale markets is limited due to intra-
group sales and so wholesale energy markets are not as liquid as
they need to be to provide reliable and trustworthy price signals
for market participants (e.g. to provide reliable price signals for
new investments). Long-term contracts contribute to locking-in
the markets-for instance they prevent alternative suppliers
from supplying customers on the retail markets. Europe needs
more interconnection capacity. But at the moment, there is in-
sufficient investment to build additional new capacity. This is
particularly worrying because it is mainly the vertically integrated
companies, i.e. those active in the supply and network areas, that
failed to invest in network expansion.73
72. See Final Report, supra note 2, at 5, 1 14-17; Technical Annex to Final Report,
supra note 71, at 37-39, 130-142, 1 76-86, 393-427. The more concentrated electricity
wholesale markets are the higher the price-cost mark-up. See LONDON ECONOMICS,
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF Six EUROPEAN WHOLESALE MARKETS IN 2003, 2004 AND
2005, at 784 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/en-
ergy/inquiry/electricityfinal-part4.pdf.
73. For example, the Technical Annex to Final Report, supra note 71, at 178-79,
541, tbl. 26, shows that a selected group of TSOs collected significant congestion reve-
nues. These revenues are generated by auctioning off the scarce interconnector capac-
ity. The total amount of revenues collected by these TSOs between 2001 and 2005 was
about C1.3 billion. However, only C250 million of these revenues, i.e. less than twenty
percent, was invested back into increased capacity. See Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm'r for
Competition Policy, Introductory Remarks on Final Report of Energy Sector Competi-
tion Inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=SPEECH/07/4&format-HTML&aged=1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=EN [here-
inafter Neelie Kroes, Introductory Remarks].
Article 6 (6) of Commission Regulation No. 1228/2003 states that revenues result-
ing from the allocation of congested interconnector capacity shall be used for: (a)
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Thirdly, there is very little cross-border integration and
cross-border competition. Incumbents largely keep to their
traditional markets, and rarely enter other national markets as
large-scale competitors. For instance, in 2004 cross-border flows
of electricity represented around 10.7% of total consumption,
which is an increase of only around two percentage points com-
pared to 2000. TM In addition, energy prices for commercial users
vary significantly from Member State to Member State.75 Price
differences for electricity for industrial customers in the EU, for
instance, are more than one hundred percent in some cases.
76
These differences are not eroded through import competition.
Different market designs between Member States contribute to
the gloomy picture rendering it difficult to move energy from
one point in Europe to another. The lack of market integration
is largely due to the fact that the interconnection capacity availa-
ble to the market between many Member States is still insuffi-
cient to allow proper integration of national markets and com-
petitive pressure from imports. Congestion is frequent at many
borders in the EU.
On top of this outdated market structure, there is a lack of
transparency, for example with respect to available network ca-
pacity and the forecast and actual demand and supply balance,
resulting in disadvantages for everybody except the incumbents
who are present in many of the trades and have access to this
information. As a result, there is little trust in market prices and
new entrants find it difficult to understand how the markets
work and what risks they are taking on.7 7 It therefore discour-
guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; (b) network investments
maintaining or increasing interconnector capacities, or; (c) as an income to be taken
into account by the regulatory authorities when approving the methodology for calcu-
lating network tariffs, and/or in assessing whether tariffs should be modified. See Com-
mission Regulation No. 1228/2003, art. 6, O.J. L 176/1, at 5 (2003).
74. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council and the European Parliament, Report on Progress in Creating
the Internal Gas and Electricity Market, COM (2005) 568 Final, at 5 (Nov. 2005) [here-
inafter Report on Progress].
75. See id. at 4; Neelie Kroes, Introductory Remarks, supra note 73.
76. See Report on Progress, supra note 74, COM (2005) 568 Final, at 4.
77. See id. at 8-9; Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm'r in Charge of Competition Policy,
Towards an Efficient and Integrated European Energy Market-First Findings and
Next Steps, Public Presentation of Preliminary Findings of Energy Sector Inquiry (Feb.
16, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/06/92&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
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ages participation in these markets by newcomers.78 When
prices do not react to changes in actual supply and demand, in-
vestment by newcomers is threatened, which reduces security of
supply and the possibility of more environmentally friendly en-
ergy sources.
B. Intrinsic Deficiencies of the Current Unbundling Regime
As the results of the Commission's Sector Inquiry empha-
size, one of the underlying problems in the sector is the lack of
effective unbundling of vertically integrated networks. In addi-
tion, the evidence collected by the Commission in the follow up
phase79 confirms that the mere implementation of existing un-
bundling legislation is not sufficient and does not address the
malfunctioning of the energy markets. Even where Member
States have adopted the unbundling provisions required under
the Electricity and Gas Directives, this does not necessarily mean
that network operators comply with them. 0 Furthermore, even
where the unbundling provisions are fully implemented, the Sec-
tor Inquiry has demonstrated that incentives for preferential
treatment within vertically integrated operators remain.81
Fundamentally, the current unbundling regime does not
suppress the inherent conflict of interest that stems from vertical
integration of network and generation and/or supply interest.
The incumbent suppliers view their networks as strategic assets
that serve their commercial interests. Even when there is an at-
78. Energy consumers remain reluctant to exercise their right to switch energy
providers. In the electricity sector, the percentage of large users that have actually
changed supplier is relatively high (over 50%) in the UK, whereas the switch rate in
France is average for Europe at about 25% (in Germany this percentage is relatively
low, about 10%). For gas, the range of figures raise from 0% for Poland, 7% for Ger-
many towards more than 50% for the U.K, Belgium and other Member States. See Re-
port on Progress, supra note 74, COM (2005) 568 Final, at 10.
79. The Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of en-
ergy companies in Hungary, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and Austria in 2006. See
Commission Press Release, MEMO/06/203 (May 17, 2003) (reporting inspections in
Germany, Italy, France and Belgium); Commission Press Release, MEMO/06/205 (May
17, 2006) (reporting inspection in Hungary). Due to ongoing investigation, the results
of the opened cases are not further elaborated in this Article.
80. EUR. REGULATORS' GROUP FOR ELEC. AND GAS ("ERGEG"), 3RD LEGISLATIVE
PACKAGE INPUT PAPER 1: UNBUNDLING 23 (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.ergeg.
org/portal/page/portal/ERGEGHOME/ERGEGDOCS/ERGEGDOCUMENTS_
NEW/Energy%20documents/C07-SER-3-06-1 -PD_3rdLegPackageUnbundlingfinal.
pdf [hereinafter ERGEG PAPER].
81. Id. at 27.
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tempt to abide by the letter and spirit of the current unbundling
rules, the network company is often unclear of its objective and
role. It cannot combine the diverging targets of offering non-
discriminatory TPA and complying with the unbundling regime
versus optimization of the return to the vertically integrated
company. This leads to a high risk that the companies con-
cerned will engage in anti-competitive strategies or, more gener-
ally, in sub-optimal behavior as a network operator.
In addition, the fact that the incumbent suppliers own the
transmission network has a chilling effect on the investment
strategy of third parties in markets open to competition. New
entrants will hesitate to invest if they are not convinced that the
network operator will treat them fairly. For instance, it is not
attractive for new entrants to invest in a power plant or new gas
import infrastructure if there is a risk that requests for connec-
tion to the network are met with unreasonable requirements
such as unreasonable payments to remove the alleged conges-
tion supposedly caused by the newly connected plant.
One might argue that these observations are rather theoret-
ical. However, this line of argument was strongly supported by
the European Regulator's Group for Electricity and Gas.82
A number of drawbacks of the current unbundling regime
have also been identified in practice inter alia in the Sector In-
quiry. There are myriad possibilities for a vertically integrated
company to discriminate against competitors, the main ones be-
ing discrimination with respect to TPA, information leakage and
distorted investment incentives.
The current unbundling rules do not remove the incentives
and possibilities for discrimination with respect to TPA. Often,
changes to network access conditions have to be approved by the
TSO's parent company where supply affiliates are represented.
Network operators that have supply interests usually have both
the ability and incentives to offer preferential treatment to that
supply business and this leads to discrimination of their competi-
tors. There are various means through which such discrimina-
tion may take place, some of which are difficult to detect and/or
remedy and sanction, even for a specialized regulatory body: de-
laying or complicating the connection of new entrants' power
plants to networks, maintaining artificially small balancing
82. See generally id.
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zones, charging high balancing fees, which will in effect be pri-
marily paid by new entrants, and not making available unused
capacities or not using implicit auctions (which allow for energy
and capacity to be traded together).83
The Commission gathered various indications during its
Sector Inquiry confirming the existence of discrimination with
respect to TPA. Examples include:
(i) A TSO grants its affiliated supply company substantive re-
bates on the transportation fees as compared to non-affiliated
network users. In doing so, the network operator directly
supports the competitive position of the related supply com-
pany. This appears to be an overall business strategy carried
out by some integrated gas companies and leads to excessive
access tariffs, which raise competitors' costs;
8 4
(ii) A German gas incumbent was able to offer a gas delivery
contract for a new power plant requiring substantial import
capacity, to be shipped through the network of its "associ-
ated" network company. At the same time new entrants were
not granted firm capacity on an almost identical pipelines
path, although the capacities they requested were substan-
tially lower than the ones granted to the power plant. Under
the current provisions, such discrimination is difficult to de-
tect;
85
(iii) The nomination procedure for gas transport capacities
appears to be different vis-A-vis different shippers. "While the
supply company of vertically integrated operators can nomi-
nate their capacities directly to the network's dispatching cen-
tre, third parties with short term interruptible contracts still
have to nominate their capacities in advance to the [network
operator] who aggregates them before sending them to the
dispatching centre for execution."
8 6
Information leakage between the supply and network affiliates
of legally unbundled, but still vertically integrated, network oper-
ators is possible, and given the clear advantages for the group as
a whole, it is likely to be a common practice.8 7 Despite informa-
83. See id. at 11-13, 26-28. In implicit auctions both the energy and the corre-
sponding transmission product between bidding/price areas are traded simultaneously
and are coupled. In explicit auctions, only the transmission product between the two
areas is traded.
84. See Technical Annex to Final Report, supra note 71, at 58, 1 155.
85. See id. at 61, 168.
86. Id. at 60, 165.
87. See David Newbery, Refining Market Design 20 (Sept. 9, 2005) (paper presented
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tion barriers, i.e. "Chinese walls," put in place under the legal
unbundling regime, information that facilitates discrimination
is, in some cases, systematically shared between the network op-
erator and the company's competitive activities. This under-
mines the trust of alternative producers and suppliers in the
functioning of the market:
In the Sector Inquiry, the TSOs were asked to provide infor-
mation about their practical implementation of the un-
bundling requirements. Where this has not yet been fully
completed, the process is allegedly under way. The TSOs re-
plies, however, point to a certain number of admitted short-
comings as regards the current level of unbundling. For ex-
ample, top management of the supply company [which are
represented at the parent level] often have access to strategic
business information of the transport company, either di-
rectly or as a result of their representation in the Supervisory
or Administrative Board of the latter.88
The same holds true for both transmission and DSOs where
insights into the activities of competitors are made available to
affiliate supply businesses.89 The Sector Inquiry has also re-
vealed that "special relationships" within vertically integrated
structures lead to systematic copying of emails to the formally
unbundled, but affiliated branches (lack of "information un-
bundling"), whilst third parties do not get access to this type of
information at the same time.9" For example, in some cases it
appears that central functions, such as legal advice, are still pro-
vided by the group holding company to all members of the
at the Sustainable Energy Specific Support Assessment Conference: Implementing the
Internal Market of Electricity: Proposals and Timetables), available at http://www.sessa.
eu.com/documents/final/SESSA~reportwp3.pdf ("Vertically integrated transmission
and generation companies can exploit informational advantages, discriminate in the
provision of access, balancing and other ancillary services, and cross-subsidise competi-
tive activities by inflating monopoly costs.").
88. Technical Annex to Final Report, supra note 71, at 57, 153.
89. See id. The network operator is informed about the envisaged change of sup-
plier, as this supplier has to have access to the network in order to supply the customer.
Information provided in the sector inquiry shows that network operators may find a way
to inform the management of a vertically integrated supply branch when a customer is
considering switching suppliers. As a result, customers are prevented from switching
suppliers; therefore, market entry for competitors becomes difficult. Moreover, net-
work companies provide more detailed information on, for example, load, outages, and
generation from wind turbines to their affiliate supply company to optimize their trad-
ing and production portfolio.
90. See id. at 59, 161.
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group, which clearly reduces the scope for objective treatment of
all market participants by the TSOs.
Most importantly, with the current state of unbundling, in-
vestment incentives remain distorted. The degree of autonomy over
investment decisions taken by legally and functionally unbun-
dled network operators tends to be too low vis-A-vis their parent
companies, so that investment decisions in new infrastructure
projects are in practice taken by the group as a whole. 9 As such,
investment decisions of vertically integrated undertakings are
very often biased towards the needs of its supply affiliates.92
Since the vertically integrated incumbents normally have very
strong market positions as suppliers in the area where they con-
trol the network, it is often in their interest not to invest in infra-
structure that would bring additional competition to this area.
The interest in protecting the market power and profitability of
their supply business trumps the interest in increasing (regu-
lated) network business. There are an increasing number of ex-
amples that illustrate this phenomenon. Indications of discrimi-
natory behavior have been found with regard to investment deci-
sions taken by the integrated gas companies. Certain investment
decisions on network extensions of the transport company have
to be approved by an investment committee of the parent com-
pany of the TSO. In a number of cases, companies have only
invested in capacity expansions when their related supply arms
have previously confirmed their interest for the bulk of the extra
capacity. By contrast, investments do not take place when inter-
ests in extra capacity mainly come from competitors. 93 Invest-
ment figures from recent years show that vertically integrated
companies have reinvested significantly less of their receipts
from cross-border congestion rents in new interconnectors than
fully unbundled ones.9 4
91. See id. at 59, 160. Under the existing Electricity and Gas Directives, certain
coordination mechanisms are still allowed to ensure supervision rights of the parent
companies regarding the return on assets. For instance, parent companies are able to
approve financial plans and set global limits regarding the indebtedness of subsidiaries.
See id. at 56, 146.
92. See id. at 58, 157 (discussing investment decisions of integrated gas compa-
nies); id. at 162, 487 (discussing investment decisions regarding new power plants).
93. See id. at 58, 157.
94. Andris Piebalgs, Energy Comm'r, Speech at the European Union Energy Law
Conference: Better Choice, Service and Prices in the New European Energy Market
(Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
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The limits of the current unbundling regime are exposed by
the current governance of network operators vertically inte-
grated with a supply activity, which demonstrates the conflict of
interest between the supply and network business. Furthermore,
this is a governance issue that regulatory oversight finds very dif-
ficult to address in a satisfactory manner despite its best inten-
tions (due to a lack of monitoring, lack of powers, lack of re-
sources, and a lack of cooperation between regional operators,
regulators find it difficult to verify that the current unbundling
regime is effectively implemented and respected on a day-to-day
basis).
To address the malfunctioning European energy markets,
the Commission can use its powers of competition law enforce-
ment on the one hand, and exercise its right of legislative initia-
tive on the other hand. The Final Report on the Sector Inquiry
made it clear how urgent and important it is that the enforce-
ment of competition law goes hand-in-hand with stronger regu-
latory framework.
III. IMPROVING COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS
A. Competition Law Enforcement
The Commission is vested with powers to introduce compe-
tition into the energy market through competition law enforce-
ment. 5 It has been developing competition cases that address
competition problems along the gas and electricity supply chains
and making use of its powers under antitrust rules (Articles 81,
82 and 86 of the EC Treaty), merger control rules (Regulation
139/2004), and state aid control (Articles 87 and 88 of the EC
Treaty).96 This comprehensive strategy puts the incumbents
under a maximum amount of pressure to stop anti-competitive
ence=SPEECH/07/562&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN
("The investment figures over recent years show this; in the past 5 years vertically inte-
grated companies have reinvested significantly less of the receipts from cross-border
congestion rents than fully unbundled ones, 17% compared to 33%.").
95. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, arts. 1, 4, 20, 23, 24, O.J. L 1/1 (2003)
(applying articles 81 and 82 of the European Community Treaty, discussing the powers
of the Commission to apply articles 81 and 82, and discussing the power of the Commis-
sion to investigate, impose fines, and impose penalty payments).
96. See Commission Press Release, IP/07/26 (Jan. 10, 2007) (noting that a number
of companies in the energy sector are being investigated by the Commission under anti-
trust, merger control and state aid rules).
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behavior. Competition problems exist throughout the gas and
electricity supply chains. Therefore, when exercising its power,
the Commission aims at ensuring that the impact of its action at
one level is not diminished by conduct at other levels. The dif-
ferent levels of the energy supply chain include:
i) Upstream supplies and production of gas and electricity:
Obtaining gas and electricity supplies, either though the
wholesale market, imports, or by acquiring production as-
sets under competitive conditions is a necessary step in
supplying customers. Conduct that seeks to deny access
to these resources may involve, for instance, capacity
hoarding in transit pipes, foreclosure through the conclu-
sion of long-term contracts, hoarding of sites to build in-
frastructure (e.g. electricity generation or gas storage), or
manipulation of the market by capacity withdrawal;
ii) Networks and ancillary services: Access to gas and elec-
tricity supplies serves little purpose if there is no access to
networks to transport the products to (final) customers
or if access is only granted on anti-competitive condi-
tions. Anti-competitive conduct related to these issues in-
cludes failure to expand networks in response to market
demand, raising rivals costs through network tariffs, or
unfavorable balancing conditions;
iii) Access to downstream customers: The ability to obtain
supplies of gas and electricity and transportation is futile
if customers are not contestable. Conduct that seeks to
restrict access to customers may include foreclosure by
long-term contracts or the imposition of regulated tariffs
that render the acquisition of new customers (or keeping
already acquired ones) impossible without incurring
losses.
There have been various competition cases pursued by the
Commission and national regulatory authorities in the energy
sector under Articles 81 and 82 EC.9 7 For instance, an important
case pursued by the Commission to ensure open access to net-
works was the Marathon case.9 8 The case concerned the alleged
refusal in the 1990s by five important gas transport companies to
grant the Norwegian subsidiary of the U.S. gas producer Mara-
97. See Commission Press Release, MEMO/03/86 (Apr. 16, 2003) (discussing a se-
ries of cases where the Commission enforced its competition policies).
98. See Commission Press Release, IP/01/1641 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Mara-
thon Press Release].
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thon access to gas transport networks.99 Company by company,
the Commission closed its cases when it received commitments
to significantly improve access to gas transport networks.100 The
Commission closed the case with Thyssengas in 2001, with
Gasunie and BEB in 2003, and with Gaz de France ("GDF") and
Ruhrgas in 2004.1 The terms of the settlement were demand-
ing for the companies: Gaz de France and Ruhrgas both agreed
to have entry/exit model transport contracts and to reduce the
number of balancing zones.' 0 2 Gaz de France also introduced a
gas release program for three years.10 3
In the ENI case of 2006,104 the Italian Competition Author-
ity fined ENI for abusing its dominant position by hindering the
entry of independent operators into the Italian wholesale gas
market. 5 ENI had stopped upgrading the Trans-Tunisian Pipe-
line Company ("TTPC") gas pipeline, which brought gas from
Algeria across Tunisia, even though ENI had already signed ship-
99. See Commission Press Release, IP/03/547 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter
Gasunie Press Release].
100. See Marathon Press Release, supra note 98 ("The European Commission has
decided to close the Marathon case.. . after the German gas company committed itself
to grant improved access to its pipeline work."); Gasunie Press Release, supra note 99
(closing the case and discussing the commitments by Gasunie to improve access to its
pipeline network); Commission Press Release, IP/04/753 (Apr. 30, 2004) (stating that
the Commission has closed its case, because "[a]fter long parallel negotiations ... Gaz
de France and Ruhrgas have made commitments to improve third party access .... ")
[hereinafter Ruhrgas Press Release]; Commission Press Release, IP/03/1129 (Jul. 29,
2007) (declaring that the Commission has closed its probe because of commitments
made by BEB on five points) [hereinafter BEB Press Release].
101. See Marathon Press Release, supra note 98; Gasunie Press Release, supra note
99; Ruhrgas Press Release, supra note 100; BEB Press Release, supra note 100.
102. See Ruhrgas Press Release, supra note 100 (noting that Gaz de France's tariff
and balancing zones, which are based on France's entry/exit transport system, will grad-
ually be reduced from seven zones to four, and stating that Ruhrgas' will reduce its
zones from six to four).
103. See id. (noting that Gaz de France committed to implement a gas release pro-
gram in southern France starting in January 2005).
104. See Italian Competition Authority Bulletin, n.5/2006, Provision No. 15174
(imposing a fine on ENI and Trans-Tunisian Pipeline Company), available at http://
www.agcm.it/AGCMITA/DSAP/DSAP_287.NSF/6393dfc338215725c1256a41002b622
8/95eaded91f188f9ac125711b0056a918?OpenDocument; see also Tribunale Amminis-
trativo Regionale del Lazio, n. 3582/2006, available at http://www.giustizia-amministra-
tiva.it/ricerca2/index.asp (confirming the sanction against Trans-Tunisian Pipeline
Company).
105. See Press Release, AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ENI
Fined C290M for Abuse of Dominant Market Position in Wholesale Supply of Natural
Gas (Feb. 15, 2006) (discussing the February 15, 2006 decision by the Italian Competi-
tion Authority to fine ENI for anti-competitive conduct in Italy's gas market).
2008] IMPROVING COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS 1413
ping contracts with independent shippers. 10 6 Apparently, ENI's
network arm had found the upgrade of the TPPC pipeline to be
commercially attractive, but ENI's supply arm feared the in-
crease in supply competition in Italy that would result."°7
Under merger control rules, a number of decisions in the
energy sector were made by the Commission in recent years.
The review focused on addressing anti-competitive effects arising
from the transaction via appropriate remedies on the affected
markets. For instance, in the E. ON/MOL case of 2005, the Com-
mission approved the acquisition by E.ON Ruhrgas ("E.ON"),
one of the two largest electricity and gas companies in Germany,
of the gas wholesale trading and storage activities of MOL F61dg-
dizellit6 Rt. ("MOL"), the incumbent oil and gas company in
Hungary.' The Commission was concerned that the acquisi-
tion would affect competition on the markets in Hungary for the
supply of electricity and gas to final customers, and for the gen-
eration and wholesale supply of electricity.' 9 To address these
concerns it required inter alia ownership unbundling of gas pro-
duction, and transmission activities (retained by MOL) from
wholesale and trading activities acquired by E.ON, through the
divestiture of MOL's remaining minority interest in MOL
Wholesale, Marketing, and Trading ("MOL WMT") and MOL
Storage.110
In the Gaz de France/Suez case of 2006, the Commission ap-
proved the merger between GDF and Suez subject to certain
conditions."' Initially, the Commission found that the merger
106. See id. (noting that ENI had begun upgrades on the Trans-Tunisian Pipeline
Company pipeline under transport contracts signed with a number of shippers but sub-
sequently discontinued work on the upgrades).
107. See Press Release, AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, The
Competition Authority has commenced an investigation into an alleged abuse of domi-
nant position by ENI on the gas market (Feb. 15, 2006) (noting that between 2002 and
2003 the Trans-Tunisian Pipeline Company decided to increase the transport capacity
of its gas pipeline but that its parent company, ENI, viewed such an increase in capacity
as a potential oversupply of gas which could threaten its financial interests).
108. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.3696/E.ON.MOL (Dec. 21, 2005) (un-
official version).
109. Id. 280-83.
110. Id. 735-37.
111. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4180, 1229 (Nov. 14, 2006) (unoffi-
cial version). Gaz de France is the incumbent gas supplier in France and is one of the
main competitors on the Belgian gas and electricity markets, partly via Socit6 de Pro-
duction d'Electricit6, which it jointly controls with Centrica and which is the second
largest electricity generator in Belgium. The Suez group includes Electrabel, the in-
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would have anti-competitive effects on the gas and electricity
wholesale and retail markets in Belgium, and on the gas markets
in France, because of significant barriers to entry and decreased
competition between GDF and Suez.112 To address these con-
cerns the parties agreed: (a) to divest Distrigaz, a company that
was part of the Suez group, the incumbent on the Belgian gas
market, and a significant participant in the French gas market;
(b) to divest Socift6 de Production d'llectricit6 ("SPE"), the
main competitor to Electrabel on the Belgian electricity market;
and (c) to relinquish control of Fluxys, which was part of the
Suez group and the owner and operator of the Belgian gas net-
work. So far the merger has not been implemented.' 13
Other notable merger cases include the Energias de Portugal
("EDP")/Gas de Portugal SGPS ("GDP") case11 4 and the DONG/
Elsam/Energi E2 case."'
The Commission has also used its powers to control state
aid to avoid distortions in the energy sector. In particular, these
cumbent electricity supplier in Belgium, and Distrigaz, the incumbent gas supplier in
Belgium. Suez is also active on the gas and electricity markets in France. Id. 3-7.
112. Id. 1 106-07.
113. Details of the proposed merger can be found on Gaz de France's website. See
Gaz de France, Gaz de France-Suez Merger Plan, http://www.gazdefrance.com/EN/
D/915/gaz-de-france-suez-merger-plan.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
114. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.3440 (Sept. 12, 2004) (unofficial ver-
sion). In the Energias de Portugal/Gas de Portugal SGPS case of 2004, the Commission
prohibited the proposed acquisition of joint control over Gas de Portugal SGPS
("GDP"), the incumbent gas supplier in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal ("EDP"), the
incumbent electricity supplier in Portugal, and Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, the major
gas supplier in Italy. The Commission concluded that the proposed acquisition would
strengthen EDP's dominant position on the electricity wholesale and retail markets in
Portugal and would strengthen GDP's dominant position in the gas markets in Portu-
gal. The concentration would reduce or pre-empt the effects of liberalization, and the
remedies proposed were insufficient. EDP appealed against this decision and on Sep-
tember 21, 2005, the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal. See EDP v. Commis-
sion, Case T-87/05 (CFI Sept. 24, 2005) (not yet reported).
115. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.3868-DONG/Elsam/EnergiE2 (Mar. 14,
2006) (unofficial version). In the DONG/Elsam/Energi E2 case of 2006, subject to cer-
tain conditions, the Commission approved the acquisition of Elsam and Energi E2, re-
gional electricity generation incumbents in Denmark, and two smaller electricity suppli-
ers in Denmark, by DONG, the Danish state-owned gas incumbent. The Commission
was concerned that the merger would have anti-competitive effects in several gas mar-
kets in Denmark due to the removal of Elsam and E2 as potential competitors, and the
potential for DONG to weaken its remaining market competitors. Id. 385. To address
these concerns, DONG agreed inter alia to divest the larger of its two gas storage facili-
ties in Denmark. Id. 707.
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state aid decisions focused on aid to incumbents," 6 aid to envi-
ronmentally friendly ways of generating electricity," 7 and aid to
compensate for "stranded costs."' 8
Competition law enforcement has contributed to, and will
continue to contribute to strengthening competition in Euro-
pean energy markets." 9 As highlighted by the Sector Inquiry,
however, there are numerous obstacles to competition that are
linked to deficiencies inherent in the current regulatory frame-
work, which cannot be effectively dealt with by competition law
enforcement. It is clear that competition policy alone-in its
case-based approach-is not sufficient to guarantee effective
competition in gas and electricity markets. Parallel to the en-
forcement of individual cases, key issues relating to market struc-
ture and the regulatory environment must be comprehensively
and effectively addressed through improvements to the legal
framework.
116. This is best illustrated by the aid granted to Electricitd de France ("EDF") in
the form of an unlimited state guarantee (which enabled EDF to obtain the best credit
ratings) and tax concessions. On December 16, 2003, the Commission decided that the
unlimited guarantee granted to EDF was incompatible state aid and that EDF should
reimburse the unpaid tax of C889 million. See Commission Decision No. 2005/145/EC,
OJ. L 49/9, at 27 (2005).
117. The most well-known of these cases is PreussenElektra v. Schleswag, Case C-379/
98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2099. As explained in the Community guidelines on state aid for
environmental protection, the main issues in these cases are usually (a) whether state
resources are involved (in this particular case the Court decided that they were not
involved), and (b) whether the state aid may be regarded as necessary to ensure the
environmental protection and sustainable development without having disproportion-
ate effects on competition and economic growth. See Community Guidelines on State
Aid for Environmental Protection, OJ. C 37/3, at 3 (2001).
118. These are cases where public compensation is granted when investments
(e.g., in the construction of electricity generators) prior to liberalization face real losses
as they will not be sufficiently efficient to face a competitive electricity market following
liberalization. See Commission Press Release, IP/04/1123 (Sept. 22, 2004) ("[T]he
Commission recognizes investments in . . .economically ineffective power plants as a
category of stranded costs."). The aim of the Commission is to ensure that any compen-
sation should not exceed what is necessary to repay the shortfall in investment cost
repayments over the asset's lifetime, including where necessary a reasonable profit mar-
gin.
119. See Technical Annex to Final Report, supra note 71, at 12-13. In the United
States, the detrimental effects for competition of vertical integration are shown by vari-
ous court decisions finding violations of anti-trust law. See generally United States v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973) (ruling against the behavior of a
vertically integrated undertaking that refused to source cheaper electricity supplies
through its transmission affiliate).
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B. New Legislative Measures
At its meeting on March 8-9, 2007, the European Council
invited the Commission to develop legislative proposals for the
"effective separation of supply and production activities from
network operations .... ,1120 And the European Parliament, in its
Resolution on Prospects for the internal gas and electricity mar-
ket adopted on July 10, 2007, expressed strong political support
for a common energy policy, considering that transmission own-
ership unbundling is the "most effective tool to promote invest-
ments in infrastructures in a non-discriminatory way, fair access
to the grid for new entrants and transparency in the market."' 121
On September 19, 2007, the Commission put forward its
third liberalization package of legislative proposals (the "third
legislative package"), which entails a set of measures to improve
the functioning of the energy markets.' 22 The proposed pack-
age seeks to address the malfunctioning of the European energy
markets outlined above, and emphasizes strengthening the cur-
rent (insufficient) level of unbundling. The measures broadly
cover five main areas: unbundling, regulatory oversight and co-
operation between regulators, cooperation between transmis-
sion network operators, transparency, and finally access to stor-
age and liquefied natural gas ("LNG") facilities. 121
1. Effective Unbundling
Pursuant to the Commission's third legislative package,
Member States would have to "ensure that the same person or
persons cannot exercise control over a supply undertaking and,
at the same time, hold any interest in, or exercise any right over,
120. European Council Meeting in Brussels, Mar. 8-9, 2007, Presidency Conclu-
sions, 7224/1/07 REV 1.
121. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 29, 2.
122. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final; Third
Gas Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 529 Final; Commission of the European
Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil, Amending Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network
for cross-border exchanges in electricity, COM (2007) 531 Final (Sept. 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Electricity Regulation]; Proposal for a Regulation, COM (2007) 532 Final (Sept.
2007) (amending Regulation 2005/1775/EC on conditions for access to the natural gas
transmission networks) [hereinafter Gas Regulation], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/electricity/package_2007/index_en.htm.
123. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 3
(outlining the measures discussed in the proposal package).
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a transmission system operator or transmission system."'1 24 In
practice this means that if a person or company has direct or
indirect control over a network operator, this person or com-
pany may not control or have any interest in a supply undertak-
ing and vice versa. Consequently, network operators of electric-
ity and gas grids are not allowed to be affiliated with a group that
is also active in supply, generation, and production.
In order to fully preserve the interests of the shareholders
of vertically integrated companies, Member States have the
choice to implement ownership unbundling either by direct di-
vestiture or by splitting the shares of the integrated company
into shares of the network company, and shares of the remain-
ing supply and production business, provided that ownership
unbundling is achieved.
125
While stating that ownership unbundling is clearly the most
effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflicts of interest
residing in vertically integrated companies, the Commission has
also proposed a possible derogation to this form of unbundling,
i.e., the ISO model. Under this approach, network assets remain
with the company, which is also active in supply, but technical
and commercial operation of the assets is put into an indepen-
dent company that is designated by the Member State. The ISO
will need to comply with the same unbundling requirements as
other network operators. This means that, among other things,
the independent network operator cannot have any interest in a
supply undertaking.
The ISO entails increased regulatory control and strength-
ened specific additional rules. For example:
The owner of the network, which is still active in supply or
production, will have to legally and functionally unbundle the
part of its company, which owns the network; The owner will
be required to finance the investments decided by the inde-
pendent operator; The ISO will have to commit to complying
with a ten-year network investment plan proposed by the reg-
ulatory authority; The designation of the ISO will have to be
124. Id. at 5.
125. See id. at 6 ("However, with a view to encouraging investment in new energy
infrastructures by supply and production companies, the present proposal includes the
possibility of a temporary derogation to ownership unbundling rules for the construc-
tion of new infrastructure.").
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approved by the Commission. 26
The ISO model proposed is a "deep" form (see Section V
below) .127 It requires that network owners rescind control of the
network in terms of operations and investments. If the network
owner does not want to finance an investment, the ISO or a
third party may do so.
The unbundling proposal requires the effective unbundling
of transmission system operators and supply and production ac-
tivities not only at a national level, but also throughout the EU.
In particular, this means that no supply or production company
active anywhere in the EU can own or operate a transmission
system in any Member State of the EU. This requirement ap-
plies equally to EU and non-EU companies. The third legislative
package contains safeguards to ensure that companies from
third party countries who wish to acquire a significant interest or
even control over an EU network, will have to demonstrably and
unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements
as EU companies. The Commission can intervene where a pur-
chaser cannot demonstrate both its direct and indirect indepen-
dence from supply and generation activities. The implementa-
tion of effective unbundling should respect the principle of non-
discrimination between the public and private sectors, as en-
shrined in the EC Treaty. The Commission has clarified that
structural separation means that, irrespective of public or private
classification, no person or group of persons is able to influence
the composition of the boards, the voting or decision making of
transmission system operators, or the voting or decision making
of supply or production companies. This ensures that when sup-
ply or production activities are in public ownership, the inde-
pendence of a publicly owned transmission system operator is
still guaranteed (state owned companies are not required to sell
their network or supply arm to privately owned companies). For
instance, to comply with this requirement, a public entity or the
state could transfer its rights (which provide the "influence") to
another publicly or privately owned legal person. In all cases
where unbundling is carried out, the Member State in question
126. See id. at 27-35 (presenting proposed Articles 8, 8b, 10, and 10(a) for ISOs);
Third Gas Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 529 Final, at 28-33 (presenting pro-
posed Articles 7, 7b, 9, and 9(a)).
127. See ERGEG PAPER, supra note 80, at 5.
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must demonstrate to the Commission that "in practice, the re-
sults are truly effective and that the companies operate entirely
separate from one another, providing a real level-playing field
across the whole of the EU.' 2 8
The unbundling proposals are the same for gas and electric-
ity. The Commission does not consider that the differences be-
tween the gas and electricity sector warrant different treatment
regarding unbundling. The findings from the Sector Inquiry
clearly demonstrate that fundamental problems arising from ver-
tical integration are present in both sectors. 129 On the other
hand, a distinction is made between the TSO and the DSO level;
the legislative proposals focus on effective unbundling at the
transmission level because stronger interconnecting capacity at
the transmission level is particularly relevant in terms of the
cross-border flows needed to establish a properly functioning
wholesale market and an integrated EU market.
2. Increased Powers of Regulators
The national regulatory authorities have a key role to play
in the creation of properly functioning energy markets. They
perform important tasks such as the fixing or negotiation of net-
work charges, which can have a substantial impact on inter alia
investment levels. They also have to ensure that TSOs comply
with their various obligations including unbundling require-
ments. It is therefore essential that the national regulatory au-
thorities are independent from both private and public interests
and have adequate resources and powers to effectively perform
their tasks.
The new rules will make a number of significant changes.
First of all, the legislative proposals aim to ensure that all regula-
tors are truly independent. 3 ° For example, each Member State
must ensure that its regulator is an independent legal entity,
which has authority over its own budget and has sufficient
128. Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 6.
129. See Technical Annex to Final Report, supra note 71, at 66, 169.
130. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 9
(stating that the intention of the legislative proposals is to ensure independence of
regulatory authorities, which is a "key principle of good governance and a fundamental
condition for market confidence"); Third Gas Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007)
529 Final, at 9 ("It is proposed that the regulatory authority be legally distinct and
functionally independent of any other public or private entity . ").
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human and financial resources to carry out its tasks. Further-
more, the regulator must be supported by management, which is
appointed for a non-renewable term of at least five years. In ad-
dition, there are strict rules describing when management may
be removed from office.1 3 1
Secondly, regulators' statutory powers and duties will be
strengthened. They will be able to issue binding decisions on
companies, to take appropriate measures in cases where the
functioning of the gas and electricity markets is insufficient, and
to impose penalties on companies that do not comply with legal
obligations or with decisions from regulators.1 3
2
Thirdly, regulators will be required to cooperate with regu-
lators from other Member States and all regulators will have the
same clear objective of promoting competition, effective market
opening, and an efficient and secure network system.1 33
These more detailed requirements for national regulators,
in combination with the mandate to cooperate at the European
level, will help resolve the European patchwork seen today re-
garding the powers of regulators, their responsibility, and their
independence. Without independent regulators that cooperate
with each other there can be no functioning internal market for
electricity and gas.
The establishment of a European Agency (the "Agency") for
the cooperation of Energy Regulators will complement, at the
European level, the regulatory tasks performed at the national
level. The creation of the Agency implies a transition from the
current structure for international cooperation of regulators in
the so-called European Regulators Group for Electricity and
Gas.1 34 The Agency will help ensure that national regulatory au-
131. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 35
(proposing Article 22(a), which states that "management is appointed for a non renew-
able fixed term of at least five years, and may only be relieved from office during its
term if it no longer fulfills the conditions set out in this Article or it has been guilty of
serious misconduct"); Third Gas Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 529 Final, at 39
(proposing Article 24(a)).
132. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 38
(proposing Article 22(c) (3), which lists the powers of the regulatory authorities).
133. See id. at 8 ("[T]he present proposal aims to strengthen the powers of the
regulatory authorities... to ensure competitive, secure and environmentally sustaina-
ble internal electricity and gas markets within the European Union, and effective mar-
ket opening for all consumers and suppliers.").
134. The European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas was established by
the Commission as an advisory body to facilitate the consolidation of the internal mar-
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thorities have a framework within which they can cooperate, and
help create the possibility for the Agency to issue opinions on
Commission guidelines and the compatibility of national regula-
tors' decisions with such guidelines. It would also have the
power to decide on the regulatory regime for cross-border infra-
structure as well as on exemption requests for infrastructure
projects involving more than one Member State. In addition,
the Agency will ensure that there is an appropriate oversight of
the cooperation between network operators.
The way that the Agency will be governed and its institu-
tional setting are based on the "standard rules and practices for
Community regulatory agencies." ' 5 To ensure the necessary in-
dependence of regulators at the European level, however, this
Agency will be unique in that it will have a separate board of
regulators. This board will be solely responsible for all regula-
tory matters and decisions. It will function independent from an
administrative board that will be responsible for administrative
and budgetary matters.
3. Network Cooperation Among Transmission
System Operators
Existing associations of TSOs (European Transmission Sys-
tem Operators ("ETSO") and Gas Transmission Europe
("GTE")) work on a voluntary basis.'13  The third legislation
package proposes the formalization of cooperation between
TSOs to establish a main vehicle for practical improvements. 1 7
The legislative proposal obliges operators to cooperate in
order to ensure optimal management of the European transmis-
ket, in particular with respect to the preparation of draft implementing measures; it
does not have decision making powers. See Commission Decision No. 2003/796/EC,
O.J. L 296/34 (2003).
135. Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 12.
136. See id. at 13.
137. In Europe, recent blackouts (for example, Italy in September 2003 or Ger-
many in November 2006) showed that there is a need for an intensified cooperation
between TSOs and a set of rules for managing network coordination between TSOs. See
UNION FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRICITY, FINAL REPORT: SYSTEM
DISTURBANCE ON 4 NOVEMBER 2006, at 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.ucte.org/-
library/otherreports/Final-Report-20070130.pdf (identifying insufficient TSO coordi-
nation as one of the causes of the blackout); UNION FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF TRANS-
MISSION OF ELECTRICITY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 28
SEPTEMBER 2003 BLACKOUT IN ITALY 9-12 (2003), available at http://www.ucte.org/publi-
cations/otherreports/UCTE-IC-InterimReport-20031027.zip.
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sion network through the establishment of a European Network
for Transmission System Operators.1 38 It will be responsible for
three core tasks.
First, it must develop draft standards and codes that will fa-
cilitate the harmonization and compatibility of operational pro-
cedures and access regimes. 139 This will enable the free flow of
gas and electricity across the EU on the basis of compatible mar-
ket rules and will support market integration.
There will be a legal obligation to develop these standards
and codes by the network of operators, even though the codes
will have a voluntary character. 40 However, where the Commis-
sion or the (regulators') Agency is of the opinion that these
codes are either not sufficient or are not implemented, the Com-
mission may make them legally binding.
Second, the network of operators will be responsible for the
coordinated operation of the network."' This must be done in
accordance with the agreed standard and codes and through the
development of common operational tools. Especially for elec-
tricity, combined operation of the synchronous network will en-
hance security of supply. However, benefits for gas are also to be
138. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 15
(describing the role of the European Network of Transmission System Operators in
improving cooperation); Gas Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 532 Final, at 26
(establishing, with proposed Article 2(a), the European Network of Transmission Sys-
tem Operators for Gas); Electricity Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 531 Final,
at 24 (establishing with proposed Article 2(a) the European Network Transmission Sys-
tem Operators for Electricity).
139. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at
14 (describing the need for technical and market codes); Gas Regulation, supra note
122, COM (2007) 532 Final, at 26 (charging, in proposed Article 2(c), the European
Network Transmission System Operators for Gas with the task of adopting technical
and market codes); id. at 27 (detailing the areas that the codes will cover in proposed
Article 2(c)(3)); Electricity Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 531 Final, at 25
(charging the European Network Transmission System Operators for Electricity with
the task of adopting technical and market codes, and detailing the areas the codes shall
cover in proposed Article 2(c)(3)).
140. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 14
(stating that the proposal preserves the voluntary process for adopting the market and
technical codes).
141. See id. at 14 (explaining that coordination includes following market and
technical codes, exchanging network operation information, and coordinating the pub-
lication of information); Gas Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 532 Final, at 30
(charging transmission system operators, in proposed Article 2(h) (2), with the task of
promoting operational arrangements that improve management of the network); Elec-
tricity Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 531 Final, at 28.
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expected, for example in the form of coordinated publication of
access related information, such as a common transparency plat-
form.
Third, the network of operators will be required to coordi-
nate the planning of network investments and to monitor the
development of the transmission network capacities.1 4 2 The net-
work of operators must publish a bi-annual European-wide, ten-
year, forward-looking investment plan.14 This network develop-
ment plan will help identify investment gaps, notably with re-
spect to cross-border capacities. It will also serve to enhance the
consistency of national network planning and modeling. All
market participants will have an interest in the work of this net-
work of operators. The needs of network users and suppliers
must therefore be central in the work of the network operators.
These proposals are based on the assumption that the TSOs
taking part are effectively unbundled. If they are not, there is a
significant risk of collusion and other anti-competitive behavior.
Moreover, it is important to point out that this framework for
cooperation does not provide antitrust immunity. The new co-
operative structures constitute associations of undertakings
within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community and thus have to comply with this pro-
vision."'
4. Transparency
Whereas current rules on transparency focus on available
network capacities, these are to be extended to other facilities
such as gas storages and demand and supply forecasts.
The legislation also introduces record keeping obliga-
142. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at
14 (explaining the need for coordinated network investment planning); Gas Regula-
tion, supra note 122, COM (2007) 532 Final, at 27 (proposing Article 2(c) (5), which
obligates the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas to publish
an investment plan and suggesting areas to be covered); Electricity Regulation, supra
note 122, COM (2007) 531 Final, at 26.
143. See Gas Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 532 Final, at 27 (proposing
Article 2(c) (5), which obligates the European Network of Transmission System Opera-
tors for Gas to publish an investment plan and suggesting areas to be covered); id. at 26
(proposing Article 2c(1) (c)); Electricity Regulation, supra note 122, COM (2007) 531
Final, at 25-26.
144. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/73 (2006).
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tions. 145 At the moment regulators cannot effectively assess alle-
gations of market abuse. For regulators to be able to act they
must be able to study behavior of market participants in the past
and to investigate if their operational decisions were based on
sound economic reasoning or if their decisions tried to manipu-
late market prices. Electricity generators, gas network operators,
and supply undertakings will therefore be required to keep
records of all data relating to operational decisions and trades.
5. Liquefied Natural Gas and Storage
The package of measures covers access to storage facilities
and LNG terminals. Although voluntary guidelines already exist
in this respect, their poor implementation by storage operators
has given rise to the need to make the provisions legally binding.
The Commission's proposals have now passed to the Coun-
cil of Ministers,146 i.e. the Member States, and the European Par-
liament for consideration. The Council and the Parliament
must agree on the final legislation.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING
In the new legislative proposals and in the Final Report on
the Energy Sector Inquiry, the Commission emphasized that
ownership unbundling would be the most effective and stable
way to address the problems described in Section 111.147 It is
therefore useful to consider the pros and cons of ownership un-
bundling in more detail.
A. Defining Ownership Unbundling
Unbundling refers to the effective separation between the
operation of electricity and gas networks from supply and gener-
ation activities. Ownership unbundling is defined as a separa-
tion of the previously common ownership structure between net-
145. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 16
(proposing to extend transparency requirements); Gas Regulation, supra note 122,
COM (2007) 532 Final, at 33 (establishing transparency requirements and recordkeep-
ing duties for system operators in proposed Articles 6(a) and 6(b)).
146. The Energy Council considered the Commission's proposed third legislative
package on December 3, 2007.
147. See Third Electricity Directive, supra note 30, COM (2007) 528 Final, at 3;
Technical Annex to Final Report, supra note 71, at 325, 1036.
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work and supply activities of a company.14 In other words, it is a
separation of all network functions from the other activities-
including the separation of asset ownership. Ownership un-
bundling implies that a separate company is created which not
only operates, but also owns, the network assets and can remove
all shareholdings by any company involved in production and/
or supply of energy. Whilst there is considerable scope to reflect
over the best ways to implement ownership unbundling, it
should be clear from the outset that companies that are actual
suppliers in the EU could not acquire/maintain networks in the
EU.
The network operator manages system operation (i.e. the
interface with the system users), network maintenance, and net-
work investment. The main advantage of ownership unbundling
is that the conflicts of interest inherent in vertically integrated
TSOs cease to exist. Because of its monopolistic nature, regula-
tory oversight of the activities of the TSOs would still be re-
quired, but it would not need to be as detailed and intrusive and
the network operator could focus on efficient provisions of net-
work service and optimized investments.
It is important to underline that ownership unbundling
would not oblige Member States to privatize the supply and/or
network business. Where both network and supply activities are
currently in public hands, it would be possible to retain the pub-
lic ownership provided that sufficient structural separation is
achieved.
B. Arguments in Favor of Ownership Unbundling
In general, the benefits of ownership unbundling ("OU") of
transmission from production and supply are widely acknowl-
edged. Examples include: the unanimous opinion of the Euro-
pean energy regulators in a public opinion, numerous notes
from internationally renowned experts on energy economics,
energy users including the German industrial users, Verband
der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e.V. ("VIK"), and
public bodies such as the International Energy Agency and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
148. Supply within this meaning includes retail supply as well as production and
generation.
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("OECD") .149 To analyze the economic advantages of OU, refer-
ence criteria should be defined. The benchmarks against which
the effects have been analyzed relate to: (i) the effect on net-
work investment; (ii) the effect on investment in gas import in-
frastructure and LNG terminals; (iii) the effect on share prices;
(iv) the effect on credit ratings; (v) the effect on market concen-
tration; and (vi) the effect on price levels.'5 0
1. Impact of Ownership Unbundling on
Investments in Networks
Available data relating to EU Member States suggests that
ownership unbundling is positively correlated to investments in
networks. Ownership unbundling removes the distortion of in-
vestment incentives within vertically integrated companies.
Ownership unbundled TSOs, for which data was available, show
149. For instance, European Union energy regulators favor full ownership un-
bundling. The European Group of Regulators for Electricity and Gas ("ERGEG") has
confirmed that this is the preferred option. See EUROPEAN GROUP OF REGULATORS FOR
ELECTRICITY AND GAS, ERGEG's RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMMUNICA-
TION "AN ENERGY POLICY FOR EUROPE" 4 (2007), available at http://www.ergeg.org/
portal/page/portal/ERGEGHOME/ERGEGDOCS/ERGEGDOCUMENTSNEW/
Energy%20documents/C6-BM-09-05_RespToSER_2007-02-06.pdf; see, e.g., JOSEF
AURER, EU-ENERGIEPOLITIK: H6CHSTE ZEIT ZU HANDELN! 6-7 (2007), available at http://
www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwkey=U1562365; ORG. FOR ECON. Co-oP-
ERATION AND DEV., ECONOMIC SURVEY OF GERMANY 2006: SUSTAINED COMPETITION is AB-
SENT IN ENERGY MARKETS ch. 5, box 3 (2006) ("(O)wnership separation of transmission
from generation is, in principle, preferable. Introducing an independent systems oper-
ator while leaving transmission and generation in the ownership of the Verbundun-
ternehmen would entail separation of transmission asset ownership from transmission
asset management, which may result in inefficiencies."), available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/24/63/36789821.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Eco-
NOMIC SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 6 (2007) ("While both [full ownership un-
bundling and independent system operators] would go a long way towards boosting
competition, OECD experience, as reviewed by the International Energy Agency and
supported by the Commission's review, has shown that full ownership unbundling is
more effective."), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/48/39311348.pdf;
Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Electricity Market Reform in The European Union: Review of
Progress Towards Liberalization and Integration 3 (ESRC Centre for Bus. Res., Univ. of
Cambridge, Working Paper No. 471, 2005) ("Unbundling can take the form of func-
tional, accounting, legal, or ownership separation, with the last being the most effec-
tive."), available at http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/ep66.pdf; Michael Pol-
litt, The Arguments For and Against Ownership Unbundling of Energy Transmission Networks 2
(ESRC Centre for Bus. Res., Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 737, 2007) ("We
conclude that evidence seems to be that ownership unbundling of transmission is a key
part of energy market reform in the most successful reform jurisdictions."), available at
http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0714.pdf.
150. See Impact Assessment, supra note 40, SEC (2007) Final 1179, at 33, 1 5.1.1.
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a significant and constant increase in investment levels after
ownership unbundling took place.'51 In contrast, the invest-
ment figures relating to networks of vertically integrated Ger-
man and French electricity TSOs are comparatively lower.
It should be noted that tariff regulations also exercise an
important influence on every TSO's willingness to invest, as tar-
iffs are an important factor for the profitability of their invest-
ments. Part of the steep increase in investments after ownership
unbundling may therefore be explained by a greater willingness
of regulators to finance investments through tariffs due to their
increased confidence that investments are made in the interest
of the market.
Unlike ownership unbundled TSOs, vertically integrated
companies have little incentive to invest in interconnectors that
risk exposing them to more supply competition in their home
market. As shown by the Sector Inquiry, the share of reinvested
congestion revenue was about twice as high for European owner-
ship unbundled TSOs as for integrated TSOs.' 52 Ownership un-
bundled TSOs in the EU-15 reinvested 33.3% of the received
congestion revenue, whereas vertically integrated TSOs in the
EU-15 reinvested merely 16.8%.153
The potential of ownership unbundling to promote invest-
ment in network capacity can also be illustrated with the exam-
ple of investment in interconnectors by German TSOs. German
TSOs have invested only a small fraction of their revenues from
cross-border congestion by expanding or building new cross-bor-
der interconnectors: in the period from 2001 to 2005, three
German TSOs managing interconnectors generated congestion
revenues of C400-500 million. Of these revenues, only C20-30
million were used to reinforce or build new interconnectors.'54
The case of the Nordic countries is another example of how
ownership unbundled electricity TSOs have agreed to tackle
cross-border congestion. 155 In the framework of Nordel, the
151. Examples include TSOs like Spanish Red EI6ctrica de Espafia, the Czech
CEPS and the Portuguese Redes Energeticas Nacionais, where the increase in the in-
vestment amount was significant.
152. Impact Assessment, supra note 40, SEC (2007) Final 1179, at 34.
153. Id.
154. Id. No regulatory approval took place on how these companies used the con-
gestion rents as no regulator was in place. See id.
155. NORDEL, STATUS OF NORDEL'S WORK ON ENHANCING EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING OF
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body for cooperation between the TSOs in Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden, the TSOs have identified five ma-
jor cross-sections in the Nordic transmission grid, which will be
substantially reinforced in the coming years. The total invest-
ment volume of all five projects is about C800 million." 6 Eco-
nomic evidence thus confirms that ownership unbundling is
likely to spur investment in transmission networks and facilitate
entry.
2. Impact of Ownership Unbundling on Investments in
Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals
A positive correlation is also observed when considering
ownership unbundling and investments in LNG terminals:
Member States with LNG terminals in advanced stages of plan-
ning, or Member States where LNG terminals are being built by
companies other than integrated energy companies, are the
Netherlands, the U.K., and Spain, i.e. countries where the gas
networks are ownership unbundled. Moreover, in these three
Member States the number of LNG terminals being planned
and built in the past five years has been significantly higher than
in France, Belgium, Germany or Italy, where gas TSOs are still
part of integrated companies.157 Similar effects are likely regard-
ing the construction of electricity generation plants by new en-
trants.
3. Impact of Ownership Unbundling on Share Prices
The Commission has analyzed the impact of ownership un-
bundling on the share value of previously vertically integrated
energy companies. The analysis has been triggered by fears that
THE NoRDic ELECTrIcrrY MARKET 10 (2006), available at http://www.statnett.no/
Resources/Filer/Kraftmarkedet/Balansetjenester/Enhancning%20Efficient%20Func-
tioninng%20of%2Othe%2ONordic%20Electricit%E2%80%A6.pdf.
156. The Nordic experience shows, however, that ownership unbundling does not
solve all problems. In particular, state-owned TSOs may have an incentive to favor do-
mestic consumption over consumption in other Member States. This is one of the rea-
sons why enhanced cooperation between TSOs is important. TSOs must develop a
more European outlook if market integration is to become a reality.
157. In France and Belgium, only the vertically integrated incumbents have built
liquefied natural gas terminals thus far. Projects by third parties exist in France but are
very far behind in their state of development. In Italy, there is only one liquefied natu-
ral gas terminal by a non-integrated incumbent which is moving ahead. At this point,
all other numerous third-party projects have faced very considerable difficulties and
must be considered uncertain.
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ownership unbundling allegedly destroys shareholder value by
forcing the break up of companies. The Commission's impact
assessment revealed that shareholders have in fact benefited
from increasing share prices during and after the ownership re-
structuring in almost all cases. For instance, in Spain TSOs Ena-
gas and Red Electrica de Espana ("REE") for its gas and electric-
ity, in Italy TSO Terna for its electricity, and the National Grid in
the United Kingdom, which is the TSO for both gas and electric-
ity. 158 These TSOs are ownership unbundled, the majority of the
shareholding is in private ownership, and they are listed on the
stock exchange. As a general rule, the share prices of all four
TSOs, as well as the share prices of their previous owners, have
displayed a substantial increase. Generally, the TSOs clearly out-
perform the national stock market indices and their former affil-
iated suppliers. However, the latter still either outperform the
national stock market indices or display a comparable perform-
ance.
This finding can be illustrated by the example of British
Gas: immediately before the breakup of Centrica on February
14, 1997, British Gas shares closed at a price of UKE247.5.
159 If
one had bought 100 shares at that price and had subsequently
reinvested all dividends and returns of capital, one would now
hold 126 BG Group shares, worth UKY,739 each, 125 Centrica
shares, worth UK373.5 each, and 60 National Grid shares,
worth UKf795.5 each. Thus an investment of UKY100 would
now be worth UKf756.05. On the same basis, UKE100 invested
in the FTSE 100 would be worth UK197.45. 160
In Spain, stock prices for Iberdrola, Endesa and Union Fe-
nosa, which sold their electricity network assets at the end of
2002, and TSO Red Electrica de Espana increased by up to 600%
(for the period November 2002 to April 2007), compared to an
increase of the Spanish stock market index, IBEX 35, of 68%
over the same time period. Similar patterns can be found for
the unbundled Spanish TSO Enagas and its former vertically in-
tegrated parent Gas Natural."'
In Italy, the share price of the incumbent electricity com-
158. See Impact Assessment, supra note 40, SEC (2007) 1179, at 36.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
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pany ENEL, in the period from June 2004 to March 2007, devel-
oped similarly to the general stock market index even though
during this period, ENEL gradually divested its network com-
pany Tema until its remaining shareholders owned only 5% of
the outstanding shares (sale of 50% of Terna in July 2004,
13.86% in March 2005, and 29.99% in September 2005). Dur-
ing the same period, Terna outperformed the Italian stock mar-
ket.
162
4. Impact of Ownership Unbundling on Credit Ratings
Comparing the credit ratings of vertically integrated compa-
nies to energy companies without network assets, no significant
or systematic differences can be observed. This seems to provide
(counterfactual) evidence against the common view that the pre-
dictable revenue stream of the network business makes vertically
integrated companies less risky than a company without network
assets, allegedly giving it cheaper access to investment capital. It
appears that the particular financial situation of the individual
companies (e.g., debt levels), their private or public ownership,
the corporate strategy, the degree of international expansion
and country specific circumstances play a much more important
role in explaining the differences in the credit ratings than the
level of vertical integration. It is also worth noting that the
credit rating for National Grid's gas TSO is the same as for its
former parent Centrica. In fact, credit ratings before and after
this ownership unbundling did not change at all. Likewise, in
the case of ENEL, the divestiture of the Italian electricity TSO
Terna in the years 2004 and 2005 changed nothing in ENEL's
A+ rating by Standard & Poor's. 16 3
5. Impact of Ownership Unbundling on Market Concentration
Market shares of the largest generator in the electricity mar-
ket (as a percentage of total generation) are significantly higher
in Member States with legal unbundling than in those with own-
ership unbundling. Abstracting from Member States with in-
complete data, small and isolated Member States, and the spe-
cial case of Germany (where four former regional monopolists
dominate the market), average market shares of the largest gen-
162. See id.
163. Id.
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erator in 2005 in Member States with legal unbundling were
73% versus 47.7% in Member States with ownership unbundled
TSOs.
1 64
While it is true that this difference already existed to a large
extent before some of the Member States concerned imple-
mented ownership unbundling, the cases of Spain, Italy and Por-
tugal demonstrate that the market shares of the largest genera-
tor dropped significantly following the implementation of own-
ership unbundling. In all three Member States, the market
share of the largest generator fell, within three years, by more
than six percentage points. In more general terms, the degree
of market concentration as measured by the market share of the
largest electricity generator decreased between 1999 and 2005
more strongly in Member States with ownership unbundling
than in those with legal unbundling. 165
In the gas sector, ownership unbundling has equally led to
an erosion of the incumbents' market share. In particular in the
U.K. and Spain, the wholesale market shares of the incumbent
companies such as British Gas and Gas Natural have fallen below
50%.166
6. Impact of Ownership Unbundling on Prices
Electricity and gas prices are influenced by various elements
such as rising commodity prices, the prevailing mix of energy
sources, investment costs, taxes, and environmental costs. It is
therefore very difficult to compare absolute price levels across
markets. However, the evidence does indicate that some surplus
has been kept by the vertically integrated incumbent companies
due to lack of competition in retail supply, leading to signifi-
cantly higher supply margins. In this respect, weakening the
market power of vertically integrated companies has a poten-
tially dampening effect on prices.
In particular, the experience with past liberalization in the
electricity sector suggests that additional competitive pressure is
likely to have a positive influence on prices. "Total savings in the
EU25 could be of the order of tens of billions of euros." 67 In
164. Id. at 36.
165. Id. at 37.
166. See id.
167. HM TREASURY & DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, THE SINGLE MARKET: A VISION
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addition, based on a study conducted by Copenhagen Econom-
ics, 1 6 8 an economic simulation model employed by the Commis-
sion within the framework of the impact assessment has indi-
cated the existence of a substantial price-reducing effect from
ownership unbundling.1
61
A possible approach to examine the impact of ownership
unbundling on energy prices is to compare the price evolution
of Member States with and without ownership unbundled TSOs.
Such a comparison has been carried out on the basis of biannual
Eurostat price data for wholesale and household customers in
EU-27 excluding all taxes. Based on the entry into force of the
first Electricity Directive, the year 1998 was chosen as the starting
point. As of the moment a Member State implemented owner-
ship unbundling, the relative price change of this Member State
was included in the calculation of the price index for Member
States with ownership unbundling. This methodology takes into
account that the composition of Member States that apply own-
ership unbundling is changing over time and that price data for
the newer Member States is not available for all years. 7'
From 1998 to 2006, electricity prices for companies based in
countries with ownership-unbundled electricity operators have
decreased by three percent, while they have increased by six per-
cent in the same period for companies that are based in coun-
tries where the electricity companies remained vertically inte-
grated. 171 For households, this contrast in price development is
even stronger. Households in ownership-unbundled countries
paid six percent more in 2006 than in 1998, while households in
vertically-integrated countries ended up paying over 29%
FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 40 (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/
E/0/eersinglemarket21_121 .pdf.
168. Copenhagen Economics, The Potential Economic Gains From Full Market
Opening in Network Industries, study for the United Kingdom's Department of Trade
and Industry, DTI URN 07/622 (2007), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file
37074.pdf.
Market opening leads to higher productivity and lower mark-ups in network
industries. This was found in our econometric estimations in stage 2. Both
lead to an expansion of potential output for the network industries, the for-
mer by pushing the potential supply curve outwards, the latter by producing at
a more efficient level where prices are lower and production is higher.
Id. at 14.
169. See Impact Assessment, supra note 40, SEC (2007) 1179, at 63.
170. Id. at 37.
171. See id. at 38.
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more. 172
Another indicator (of fair and competitive prices) is the
margin between wholesale and retail prices. The higher this
margin, the more retail suppliers benefit and the more end cus-
tomers have to pay for their electricity. In the Netherlands and
the UK, the wholesale prices for electricity were in 2006 consist-
ently higher than in Germany. However, retail prices were lower
in the Netherlands and the UK. In fact, the price margin in Ger-
many was twice as high as in the Netherlands for both large and
small industrial customers. This observation appears to indicate
that some surplus has been kept by the vertically integrated in-
cumbent companies due to lack of competition in the retail mar-
ket.173
C. Considerations Against Ownership Unbundling
The above analysis demonstrates why ownership un-
bundling, whilst not a miracle solution to remove all obstacles to
a successful completion of the liberalization process, would ad-
dress the main shortcomings of the current unbundling regime.
However, concerns have been expressed that ownership un-
bundling would have various economic and legal drawbacks in-
cluding uncertainty regarding the impact of ownership un-
bundling on the welfare of European consumers and allegations
of expropriation or privatization of networks. Concerns have
been expressed that ownership unbundling would reduce econ-
omies of scale, bring possibly large one-off transaction costs, in-
crease the cost of capital of the supply business, or weaken the
position of European suppliers in negotiations with external sup-
pliers. This, it is argued, would then lead to less investment,
higher prices and endanger security of supply.
As a matter of fact, where full ownership unbundling has
been established, there have been no such negative conse-
quences. On the contrary, in such cases, both the network busi-
ness and the supply businesses have gone on to perform well on
an independent basis and under different regulatory regimes
and associated risk profiles. The concerns expressed above are
therefore unsupported by evidence.
More specifically, as to the alleged loss of economies of scale
172. See id.
173. Id.
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or one-off transaction costs, these would not likely be significant
when we move from the current system of legal unbundling to
ownership unbundling. Undertakings that have implemented
legal and management unbundling (which are already required
under the current EU legislation) should have already incurred
these costs-and the empirical evidence available suggests that
these have been fairly limited. Concerning more specifically the
transaction costs of ownership unbundling, the experience of
the UK shows that they are small, even for a move from full verti-
cal integration to ownership unbundling of the transmission net-
work: the one-off cost of the British Gas de-merger in 2000 was
around 3.2% of the company's yearly turnover.
Similarly, as has already been mentioned, ownership un-
bundling is actually likely to spur investment in transmission net-
works as the cost of capital of the network business, which is reg-
ulated and low risk, is likely to be lower than the vertically inte-
grated business. It certainly will also facilitate entry, and thus
positively influence investments by new entrants. Some suggest
however, that vertically integrated incumbents benefit from re-
taining ownership over the transmission network, in that the sta-
ble regulated returns of that activity diminishes their overall cost
of capital. This is said to facilitate their investment in the supply
business. As a result, it is argued that ownership unbundling
would diminish investments by the (previously vertically inte-
grated) incumbents in supply activities. Similarly, there is a con-
cern that ownership unbundling will leave an independent sup-
ply business with a much weaker bargaining position vis-d-vis ex-
ternal suppliers of energy sources.
In practice, it is very doubtful that this theoretical argument
would lead to an overall net negative impact on investment, even
by the former vertically integrated companies because energy
suppliers have many other corporate strategies to diminish their
overall cost of capital, or increase their bargaining power. The
completion of the internal energy market will also open up new
opportunities for growth of the supply business by merger and
acquisition, in particular outside the home Member States of the
companies in question-spreading the risk over a bigger scale of
activity. Moreover, the added value of the vertically integrated
companies is not so much their ownership of the network be-
cause they are already obliged to grant access to the network to
their competitors. It is rather their customer base and their
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knowledge of how to supply these customers efficiently. The ad-
vantage is thus rooted in the retail supply at distribution level.
Unbundling the transmission assets will therefore not necessarily
weaken the negotiation position of the EU suppliers vis-A-vis the
producers. 17 4
The final argument above amounts to saying that monopoly
power is required to bargain with external suppliers. However,
consumers rarely benefit from the actions of "benevolent" mo-
nopolies. Quite to the contrary, it is well accepted that multiple
levels of market power lead to double marginalization to the det-
riment of consumers. Moreover, the argument is based on a
classical pre-liberalization model of long-term contracts between
external suppliers and dominant incumbents that make the EU
vulnerable to supply shortages of Russian gas. 75 In order to en-
sure security of supply we need to pave the way for new entry for
which effective unbundling is a precondition.
In the ongoing discussion among European energy stake-
holders on ownership unbundling, various legal objections have
been voiced against introducing ownership unbundling through
EU legislation. In particular, the objections raised include the
alleged impediment of property rights (expropriation falling
foul of general principles of European Community law) under
the European Community Treaty.176
At the European level the protection of property is included
in Article 17 of the Charter of Human Rights of 2000, which is
based on "tradition, legislation, and practice in all the Member
States." 1 7 7 However, while the EU legal order recognizes the
174. Philip Lowe, Ingrida Pucinskaite, William Webster & Patrick Lindberg, Effec-
tive Unbundling of Energy Transmission Networks: Lessons From the Energy Sector Inquiry, EUR.
COMM'N COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. Spring 2007, at 32 (emphasis omitted), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn.
175. See MICHAEL FREDHOLM, GAZPROM IN CISIS: PUTIN'S QUEST FOR STATE PLAN-
NING AND RUSSIA'S GROWING NATURAL GAS DEFICIT 5-7, 12-13 (Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, No. 06/48, Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/06(48)MF.pdf ("It
would not be unreasonable to assume that it was the gas shortages of the previous win-
ter that clinched the deals for the European firms."); ALAN RILEY, THE COMING OF THE
RUSSIAN GAS DEFICIT: CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 5 (No. 116 Centre for Euro-
pean Policy Studies Brief, Oct. 2006) ("The decline in supply from the Russian gas
fields is likely to make it increasingly difficult for Gazprom to honour its supply con-
tracts to customers.").
176. See Lowe et al., supra note 174, at 33.
177. Impact Assessment, supra note 40, SEC (2007) 1179, at 16.
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protection of property, this and other fundamental rights are
not absolute prerogatives.17 8 Although it could be argued that
Article 295 of the European Community Treaty also protects the
core rights of ownership, it does not have the effect of exempt-
ing the Member States' systems of property ownership from the
fundamental rules of the Treaty.179 The exercise of property
rights may be restricted provided that those restrictions corre-
spond to objectives of general interests pursued by the commu-
nity and do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable in-
terference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaran-
teed.180 A necessity and proportionality test is applied when
assessing the compatibility of ownership unbundling with the
Treaty law and with the general principles of EC law (in particu-
lar, the rules on protection of property derived from the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms) .181
The Commission considers that the limitations resulting
from ownership unbundling can be lawfully imposed.'8 2 The
Sector Inquiry and other evidence at its disposal demonstrate
that options which allow supply companies to influence network
operations and investments do not allow integrated and compet-
itive energy markets to develop.
In any case, it appears that in a large number of unbundling
cases there would be no objection for most shareholders to re-
tain their holding of shares in both the supply and network busi-
178. Id.
179. See Commission v. Belgium, Case C-503/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-4809, 44; Konle
v. Austria, Case C-302/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3099, 38.
180. See Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, Case T-65/98 (CFI Oct. 23, 2003)
(not yet reported); Germany v. Council, Case C-280/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4973, 78;
Schrtder HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, Case 265/87,
[1989) E.C.R. 2237, 15; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R.
3727, 23.
181. Lowe et al., supra note 174, at 33.
182. See CHRISTIAN VON HAMMERSTEIN, ENTFLECHTUNG DES EIGENTUMS AN ELEKTRIZ-
ITATS - UND GASVERSORGUNGSNETZEN VON ANDEREN BEREICHEN DER ENERGIEVERSORGUNG -
HANDLUNGSFORMEN UND VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE BEWERTUNG - GUTACHTEN [OWNER-
SHIP UNBUNDLING OF ELECTRICrTY AND GAS SUPPLY NETWORKS FROM OTHER FIELDS OF
ENERGY SUPPLY - WAY OF ACTING AND CONSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION - LEGAL OPINION]
44 (2007), available at http://www.vzbv.de/mediapics/gutachten-entflechtung..
hammerstein_08_2007.pdf (legal opinion on behalf of the Federation of German Con-
sumer Organizations) (concluding that ownership unbundling is justified because of
the content and limits of property rights, and that it is not expropriation under German
constitutional law).
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nesses, as these stakes would not amount to blocking a minority
in either company or allowing them to appoint members of the
boards of the network company, and so the shareholders them-
selves would not lose any of their ownership rights.
V. MODELING AN INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR TO
ENSURE EFFECTIVE UNBUNDLING
Notwithstanding the clear benefits of unbundled and inde-
pendent TSOs, options other than ownership unbundling, such
as ISO and Regional System Operator,""3 have been brought for-
ward as alternatives by market participants and stakeholders.
Theoretical models so far developed by the European energy in-
dustry have been triggered by the Commission's initiatives re-
lated to the third legislative package, in particular to the Com-
mission's stated view that ownership unbundling is the most ef-
fective way to improve the functioning of the competitive energy
market.'1 4
In its impact assessment, the Commission analyzed the ISO
model and included the possibility of the "deep" form of ISO as
an alternative to ownership unbundling in its new legislative
package. The ISO model is characterized by the separation of
system operations from transmission ownership, as well as the
separation from ownership of upstream and downstream func-
tions. The ISO does not have economic ownership of the net-
work assets, which therefore can remain part of the vertically in-
tegrated group. The ISO is responsible for matters such as
scheduling and dispatching generation and load, allocating
scarce transmission capacity, interconnection arrangements, and
administration of tariffs governing transmission service prices.
Within the ISO approach there are variations, chiefly in the ex-
tent to which the system operator has control over investment
related decisions:
183. The ISO and the RSO models should not be confused as they are inherently
proposed to resolve different weaknesses in the development of the internal energy
markets. The main purpose of the ISO model is to reduce the scope for discrimination
and thus it entails a minimum requirement to separate transmission and supply inter-
ests. Whilst the RSO entity would also need to meet these minimum requirements, its
promotion as an alternative is primarily aimed at resolving perceived regional cross
border harmonization issues. RSOs are not an alternative to effectively unbundled
TSOs.
184. See Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market, supra note 27, COM
(2006) 841 Final, at 12.
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(i) The so-called "deep" ISO entails all the functions of the
system operator being removed from the bundled company,
leaving the latter only with the ownership of the assets. The
ISO operates the network, arranges for network connections,
undertakes emergency planning and levy for use of the net-
work, etc. It also plans and executes investments and seeks
financing if the owner declines to do so. In this way the
"deep ISO" exerts a strong influence over investment
projects. In terms of its functions and competences, the
"deep" ISO is considered to lead to a comparable outcome to
that of ownership unbundling, provided it is accompanied by
sufficiently strong and detailed regulation and permanent
regulatory oversight;
(ii) In the "shallow" ISO by contrast, all the transmission
functions remain with the bundled company apart from the
operation of the transmission network during and close to
real time. The "shallow ISO" model is therefore close to the
present legal unbundling requirements and therefore clearly
cannot be expected to achieve the same degree of effective-
ness as ownership unbundling.'
85
There is no single model for the ISO approach, and in prac-
tice there are many different ISO models in place in the United
States and the EU (for example the various RTO models in the
United States"8 6 and the British Electricity Trading and Trans-
mission Arrangements ("BETTA") model in Scotland)."s' There
is thus no ready model that Europe can simply replicate which
would attain the desired degree of unbundling. To do so, the
System Operator must be truly independent and have sufficient
powers and competence over both national and cross-border is-
sues, i.e., the "deep" form of ISO. In this case the outcome will
be as close as possible to that of ownership unbundling. Moreo-
ver, the issue of information handling needs to be dealt with. In
the ISO model, the system operator and transmission owner
might exchange market sensitive information. Preventing leak-
185. ERGEG PAPER, supra note 80, at 10, 13.
186. In most cases in the United States, ISOs have limited influence; therefore
they might be qualified as "shallow" ISOs.
187. Specific circumstances in Britain mean that the Scottish ISO model does not
raise serious concerns about discrimination. For example, there is ownership un-
bundling in England and Wales, the countries have already established an independent
TSO (National Grid), and they give National Grid incentives to act in a non-discrimina-
tory manner. There is also a very strong regulator with significant powers. These cir-
cumstances do not exist in many continental European Union Member States.
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age of this information to the supply business is difficult and re-
quires strict arrangements for the management of information
to ensure that it is put into the public domain where possible, or
strictly ring fenced where publication is not possible.
When considering an ISO as an alternative to ownership un-
bundling, one should also bear in mind that ISOs imply the un-
bundling of the network business itself, i.e., separating owner-
ship of the network from operation of the network. It therefore
introduces a new interface between the ISO and transmission
system owners, which is potentially open to abuse and therefore
has to be properly regulated. This implies burdensome regula-
tion that is necessary to ensure that TSOs behave independently.
Regulatory arrangements in these models would not only have to
be defined in a complex contractual framework, but also require
detailed supervision. In practice, regulators would continuously
have to oversee performance of the tasks attributed to the ISO.
The difference with an ownership unbundled TSO is the contin-
ued interface between transmission owner and ISO (between the
asset owner and the entrusted operator to manage the assets),
where the regulator would have to monitor compliance of the
transmission owner, approve contracts in order to be able to es-
tablish an efficient regulation of network tariffs, and settle dis-
putes between the transmission owner and the ISO. Effectively,
this would imply the regulators' "deep" involvement in the in-
vestment planning and approval process."' 8 All the above points
are reflected in the Commission's proposal.
CONCLUSION
The need for effective unbundling of networks as a prereq-
uisite for properly functioning EU energy markets is not only
theoretical, but also confirmed by the findings of the Sector In-
quiry. These findings confirm that the vertical integration of
188. In view of this interface, the European Regulator's Group for Electricity and
Gas argues that ownership unbundling is more advantageous than the "deep" ISO
model: "The ISO model adds to ownership unbundling, however, the risk of conflicts
arising as regards investing and sharing the profits resulting from transmission activity
between the operator and the owner of the assets, without any benefits for the network
users." ERGEG PAPER, supra note 80, at 5. Moreover, the regulators that first imple-
mented the ISO model in their respective European Union Member States agreed that
"conflicts between the owners of the asset and the system operator are difficult to man-
age." Id. at 32. By contrast, ownership unbundled TSOs reduced "the time needed for
planning, instructing authorization process and realizing the investments." Id.
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network and supply businesses creates a conflict of interest re-
sulting in, among other things, distorted investment incentives
and discriminatory access for competitors to the networks. It has
also become clear that the current unbundling provisions re-
quired by the Second Electricity and Gas Directives are not ade-
quate, and this view is widely shared by the European Parliament
and the European Council among others." 9 Even where they
are fully transposed into national law, there continues to be a
conflict of interest, which is at the root of many of the competi-
tion problems observed. The ineffectiveness of the current un-
bundling requirements contributes significantly to the slow pace
of market integration and the low growth in cross border trade
observed in EU electricity and gas markets.
The new third legislative package of the Commission aims
to stimulate and provide for competition by introducing owner-
ship unbundling throughout the EU at the level of transmission
systems. As this Article demonstrates, ownership unbundling is
the simplest, most effective, and stable solution to solve the in-
herent conflict of interest that so clearly plagues vertically inte-
grated TSOs. Moreover, it has already been successfully imple-
mented by many Member States. There are no legal obstacles
that would prevent the Community from introducing it, and a
growing body of evidence shows that it would bring significant
benefits to the completion of the European energy market, be-
cause it brings more investment into the network, a lower cost
for network users, and more competition on the supply side. By
contrast, there is a growing recognition that working on improv-
ing legal and management unbundling without effective separa-
tion, that at a minimum separates network ownership from every
aspect of the operation of the network, is doomed to remain un-
successful. The proposed derogation from ownership un-
bundling, i.e., the "deep" form of ISO model containing all the
functions of the network operator, including investments, is an
alternative. However, the full effectiveness of the ISO model
needs to be ensured by specific additional rules and permanent
regulatory oversight, rendering it a much heavier instrument to
ensure the same goal.
189. See Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting In Brussels (Mar. 8-9,
2007), SN 7224/1/07 REV 1, Annex 1: Energy Policy for Europe, at 16; European
Parliament Resolution, supra note 29, 1-5.
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Finally, effective unbundling will solve many but not all
problems. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cre-
ating integrated and competitive markets. Strong and consistent
regulation will also be required to ensure that unbundled TSOs,
which after all operate a monopoly structure, improve the effi-
ciency of their operations and reduce tariffs. Moreover, national
regulators need to have adequate powers and to be fully inde-
pendent, they need a framework within which they can cooper-
ate, and cross-border cooperation needs to be improved. As
mentioned above, these elements are not the focus of this Arti-
cle and are therefore only summarily addressed, but they are an
integral part of the new third legislative package the Commis-
sion has put on the table.
In the Commission's view, these measures are necessary to
create integrated and competitive energy markets in the EU for
the benefits of its citizens. The current framework has generally
freed the vertically integrated energy companies from price reg-
ulation and other constraints, but has not brought about effec-
tive competition as intended by liberalization. The Commis-
sion's aim is to ensure that competition really takes root and
that, as a consequence, consumers will be able to reap the ex-
pected benefits from liberalization.
